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Britain in the Commonwealth: The 1997 Edinburgh Commonwealth heads of 
Government meeting 
Monday, 19th March 2018 
The Court Room 
First Floor 
Senate House 
Malet Street 
London WC1E 7HU 
Programme: 
Chair: Dr Sue Onslow, Deputy Director, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School 
of Advanced Study, University of London 
Witnesses:  
Participants: 
Amitav Banerji, then Deputy Conference Secretary, Commonwealth Secretariat 
Sir Richard Dales, KCVO, CMG, then Director, Africa and the Commonwealth, 
FCO, [Written contribution] 
Martin Hatfull, then Head, Commonwealth Coordination Department, Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
Sir John Holmes GCVO, KBE, CMG, then Principal Private Secretary (PPS) to the 
Prime Minister  
Anji Hunter, then Personal Assistant to the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Tony Blair 
Stuart Mole CVO OBE, then Director and Head of the Office of the Commonwealth 
Secretary General, Chief Emeka Anyaoku 
Prunella Scarlett LVO, then Director, Commonwealth Affairs at the Royal 
Commonwealth Society (RCS) 
Introduction 
The meeting in Edinburgh in 1997 was the last occasion on which Britain hosted the 
Commonwealth heads’ meeting, and the discussions covered a range of important 
issues for the future direction of the association which remain relevant and highly 
topical: the great step forward on trade, business and investment; the denouement of 
the Nigerian crisis and the willingness to impose sanctions; the return of Fiji and the 
presence of President Nelson Mandela; the elevation of HM the Queen into the 
summit itself; the start of a visible Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) presence; 
and discussion on possible new members. 
This is the third in a series of witness seminars organized by the Institute of 
2 
Commonwealth Studies. The first focused on the formation and work of the Eminent 
Persons Group of 1986 and the outcome and impact of the EPG’s visit to apartheid 
South Africa. The second addressed the role and functions of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat since 1965 and was held on June 2013.  
This seminar is being organized in collaboration with King’s College, London. Since 
1986, the ICBH Witness Seminar Programme has conducted nearly 100 witness 
seminars on a variety of subjects: most recently, the ICBH’s witness seminar series 
has examined the work of UK Embassies/High Commissions in Washington, 
Moscow, New Delhi, Pretoria and the Caribbean. These witness seminars have been 
well received by both practitioners, and the academic community who have 
increasingly come to see that it is important to examine and analyse the function of 
British overseas missions, as well as to capture the perspective of contemporary 
actors of recent events.  
The significance of history and the importance of gathering and utilizing oral history 
interviews have also been identified in the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
The Role of the FCO in UK Government (published 29 April 2011). In oral evidence, 
Foreign Secretary William Hague stated: ‘history is vitally important in knowledge and 
practice of foreign policy’. He further stated, ‘One of the things that I have asked to 
be worked up is a better approach to how we use the alumni of the Foreign Office, 
[and]… continue to connect them more systematically to the Foreign Office.’ He went 
on to say: ‘these people who are really at the peak of their knowledge of the world, 
with immense diplomatic experience, then walk out of the door, never to be seen 
again in the Foreign Office.’ 
In terms of the Commonwealth, the Institute of Commonwealth Studies’ extensive 
collection of interviews with leading Commonwealth figures in the modern 
Commonwealth, contains a number of important interviews of those who were 
involved in the 1997 Edinburgh summit. However, the role and insights of leading 
British figures and diplomats is absent and needs to be collected, particularly as 
British officials prepare again to host a Commonwealth summit, and the UK 
government moves into the Chair-in-Office role until the 2020 Malaysian summit.  
For these reasons it is important to gather the memories of those FCO alumni who 
worked on the preparatory arrangements for the 1997 Edinburgh meeting, together 
with the recollections of senior Commonwealth diplomats, over a period in which the 
UK’s relationship within the Commonwealth continued to evolve. 
Dr Sue Onslow,  
Deputy Director, Institute of Commonwealth Studies,  
School of Advanced Study, University of London 
And 
Dr Michael Kandiah, Director, Witness Seminar Programme, 
Department of Political Economy, King’s College, London 
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Format 
The seminar has been divided into two parts. The first witness seminar panel will 
focus on the preparations around the 1997 Edinburgh summit, the summit itself and 
‘retreat’ of Commonwealth leaders at Gleneagles; and the second session will 
consider the outcome, and implications for British policy and engagement with the 
modern Commonwealth; and the role and functions of Commonwealth diplomats and 
civil society organizations.  
• The witness seminar is like a group interview or conversation, led and
moderated by the chair.
• There is an audience consisting of Commonwealth Secretariat alumni and
current staff, academics and students of foreign policy. If there is time, the
chair will ask for contributions and questions from the floor.
• The witness seminar is a public event and it will be recorded and transcribed.
• No one other than the official sound recorder should attempt to record the
event.
• All participants will be identified in the recording and transcripts. It is essential
that each speaker, whether a witness or from the floor, identify himself or
herself before speaking for the first time.
• The agreed transcript of the proceedings, with speakers and their
contributions identified, will be published electronically, on the Institute of
Commonwealth Studies’ Resources platform and on the Round Table (The
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs) website.
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Brief Chronology1 
NOTE: the following is not meant to provide an exhaustive chronology of Britain’s 
relations within the modern Commonwealth. It is intended to help refresh people’s 
memories by covering significant events and milestones in the history of the 
Commonwealth, with reference, where relevant to the UK, and to significant world 
events: 
1926 Imperial Conference: The UK and its Dominions agree they are 
‘equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any 
aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by 
common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as 
members of the British Commonwealth of Nations’. 
16 August 1930 The first British Empire Games (the forerunners of the 
Commonwealth Games), Hamilton, Canada. 
11 December 1931 The Statute of Westminster formalizes the Balfour Declaration 
(1926). Parliament renounces legislative power over the 
Dominions. It is adopted by Canada, the Irish Free State, 
Newfoundland and the Union of South Africa. Australia and 
New Zealand decline.  
16 February 1934 Self-government of the Dominion of Newfoundland is 
suspended, and replaced by the Commission of Government. 
Newfoundland ceases to be in the Commonwealth. 
4 August 1934 The second British Empire Games open in London. 
5 February 1938 The third British Empire Games open in Sydney, Australia. 
1 May 1944 The first Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference 
convenes in London. 
23 April 1946 The second Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference 
convenes in London. 
14 August 1947 Pakistan (including modern Bangladesh) joins the 
Commonwealth upon being granted independence by the UK 
15 August 1947 India joins the Commonwealth on being granted independence 
by the UK 
21 October 1947 India and Pakistan begin the first Indo-Pakistani War, over 
Kashmir and Jammu. (The first armed conflict between two 
members of the Commonwealth). 
25 November 1947 New Zealand passes the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 
(1947) and becomes a member of the Commonwealth. 
4 February 1948 Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) joins the Commonwealth on being 
granted independence by the UK. 
16 June 1948 Three European plantation managers are killed in Perak, 
sparking the Malayan Emergency, leading to the deployment 
of Commonwealth troops in Malaya. 
11 October 1948 The third Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference 
convenes in London. 
31 December 1948 India and Pakistan sign a ceasefire, ending the first Indo-
Pakistan War 
31 March 1949 Newfoundland (a Dominion since 1934) joins Canada as a 
province. 
18 April 1949 Eire leaves the Commonwealth upon becoming a republic 
(when the Republic of Ireland Act 1948 comes into effect.) 
1 Compiled by Dr Sue Onslow using a variety of open access online sources, which have 
been acknowledged where appropriate  
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22 April 1949 The fourth Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference. 
Agenda is dominated by India’s future within the 
Commonwealth. 
28 April 1949 The Commonwealth Heads of Government issue the London 
Declaration. It allows India (and henceforth all other members) 
to remain in the Commonwealth without having the British 
monarch as Head of State, creates the position of Head of the 
Commonwealth, and changes the name of the organisation to 
‘the Commonwealth of Nations’.  
26 January 1950 India becomes a republic, being the first non-Commonwealth 
Realm member of the Commonwealth. 
4 February 1950 The fourth British Empire Games open in Auckland, New 
Zealand. 
4 January 1951 The fifth Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference 
convenes in London. 
28 July 1950 The First Commonwealth Division is created, amalgamating 
Australian, British, Canadian, Indian and New Zealand forces 
engaged in the Korean War. 
6 February 1952 George VI dies, and is succeeded as monarch of the 
Commonwealth Realms and Head of the Commonwealth by 
Elizabeth II. 
28 April 1952 The British Commonwealth Occupation Force is officially 
disbanded, having transferred control of Far Eastern forces to 
British Commonwealth Forces, Korea. 
20 October 1952 Sir Evelyn Baring, Governor of Kenya, declares a state of 
emergency. (the Mau Mau uprising) 
3 June 1953 The sixth Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference 
convenes in London. 
 The creation of the Central African Federation (amalgamating 
the colonies of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the 
self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia.)  
30 July 1954 The British Empire Games are renamed ‘the British Empire 
and Commonwealth Games’, with the opening of the 1954 
Games in Vancouver, Canada. 
26 July 1955 The seventh Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference 
convenes in London. 
27 June 1956 The eight Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference 
convenes in London. 
6 March 1957 Ghana (the Gold Coast) joins the Commonwealth on being 
granted independence by the UK, becoming the first majority-
ruled African member. 
26 June 1957  The ninth Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference 
convenes in London. 
31 August 1957 The Federation of Malaya joins the Commonwealth upon being 
granted independence by the UK. It is the first monarch in the 
Commonwealth, except for the Commonwealth Realms. 
3 January 1958 The Federation of the West Indies is formed from the British 
West Indies as a self-governing colony. 
30 July 1958 the 1958 British Empire and Commonwealth Games open in 
Cardiff. 
3 February 1960 Harold Macmillan gives his Wind of Change speech to the 
Parliament of South Africa. 
3 May 1960 The tenth Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference 
convenes in London. 
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1 October 1960 Nigeria joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
8 March 1961 The eleventh Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference 
convenes in London. (The agenda is dominated by criticism of 
South Africa.) 
13 March 1961 Cyprus joins the Commonwealth, having gained independence 
from the UK the previous year. (Heavily opposed by the UK, it 
is the first small country to join.)** 
27 April 1961 Sierra Leone joins the Commonwealth, upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
31 May 1961 South Africa becomes a republic, withdrawing from the 
Commonwealth.  
9 December 1961 Tanganyika, now part of Tanzania, joins the Commonwealth 
upon being granted independence by the UK. 
31 May 1961 The Federation of the West Indies collapses. Its constituent 
states revert to being colonies of the UK, and preparations 
begin to grant them separate independence within the 
Commonwealth. 
6 August 1962 Jamaica joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
31 August 1962 Trinidad and Tobago joins the Commonwealth upon being 
granted independence by the UK. 
10 September 1962 The twelfth Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference 
convenes in London. 
9 October 1962 Uganda joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
22 November 1962 The 1962 British Empire and Commonwealth Games open in 
Perth, Australia. 
10 December 1962    Zanzibar, now part of Tanzania, joins the Commonwealth upon 
being granted independence by the UK. It is (briefly) the first 
hereditary monarch in the Commonwealth, except for the 
Commonwealth Realms. 
12 December 1963 Kenya joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
31 December 1963 The Central African Federation formally dissolves. 
26 April 1964 Two Commonwealth members, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, 
merge to form the United Republic of Tanzania, which joins the 
Commonwealth. 
6 July 1964 Malawi, previously Nyasaland and part of CAF, joins the 
Commonwealth upon being granted independence by the UK. 
8 July 1964 The thirteenth Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference 
convenes in London. 
21 September 1964 Malta joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
24 October 1964 Zambia, previously Northern Rhodesia, joins the 
Commonwealth upon being granted independence by the UK. 
18 February 1965 The Gambia joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
17 June 1965 The fourteenth Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference 
convenes in London. The Conference approves the creation of 
the Commonwealth Secretariat 
1 July 1965 The Commonwealth Secretariat is founded. Arnold Smith is 
appointed first Secretary General. 
15 August 1965 India and Pakistan begin the second Indo-Pakistani War, over 
Kashmir and Jammu. 
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6 August 1965 Singapore joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
23 September 1965 India and Pakistan sign a ceasefire. 
11 November 1965 Rhodesia issues a Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 
which is rejected by London. This sparks a 15 year crisis in the 
Commonwealth 
12 November 1965 The UK imposes full economic sanctions on Rhodesia. 
10 January 1966 The fifteenth Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference 
convenes in Lagos, Nigeria, to discuss the Rhodesia crisis. It is 
the first Conference held outside London. 
10 March 1966 The Commonwealth Secretariat Act 1966 is passed, coming 
into effect retroactively (1 July 1965), granting the Secretariat 
legal immunity in the UK. 
26 May 1966 Guyana, previously British  Guiana, joins the Commonwealth  
upon being granted independence by the UK. 
4 August 1966 The 1966 British Empire and Commonwealth Games open in 
Kingston, Jamaica. It is the first time the Games are held 
outside the so-called ‘white Commonwealth and the last time 
the Games include the British Empire in their name.  
6 September 1966 The sixteenth Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference 
convenes in London. The UK announces NIBMAR policy 
towards Rhodesia (No Independence Before Majority African 
Rule). 
30 September 1966 Botswana joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
4 October 1966 Lesotho, formerly Basutoland, joins the Commonwealth upon 
being granted independence by the UK. 
30 November 1966 Barbados joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
31 January 1968 Nauru joins the Commonwealth as a ‘Special Member’ upon 
being granted independence from a joint Australia-New-
Zealand-UK trusteeship. It is the first microstate to join. 
12 March 1968 Mauritius joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
6 September 1968 Swaziland joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
7 January 1969 The seventeenth and last Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
Conference convenes in London. 
2 March 1970 Rhodesia declares itself a republic and a new constitution 
takes effect. 
4 June 1970 Tonga joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
1 July 1970 Arnold Smith begins his second term as Commonwealth 
Secretary-General. 
16 July 1970 The 1970 British Commonwealth Games open in Edinburgh.  
28 August 1970 Samoa joins the Commonwealth, having gained independence 
from New Zealand in 1962. (Trusteeship) 
10 October 1970 Fiji joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
14 January 1971 The first Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
(CHOGM) convenes in Singapore. 
22 January 1971 At the conclusion of the first CHOGM, the assembled 
Commonwealth Heads of Government issue the Singapore 
Declaration, setting out the core political values of the 
Commonwealth. It includes commitments to individual liberty, 
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freedom from racism; peace, economic and social 
development, and international cooperation. (Along with the 
1991 Harare Declaration, this one of the two most important 
documents in the Commonwealth’s constitution.) 
26 March 1971 East Pakistan declares its independence as Bangladesh. 
3 December 1971 India intervenes in Bangladesh, sparking the Indo-Pakistan 
War of 1971. 
16 December 1971 Pakistan surrenders to India, ending the war 
1972 Pakistan leaves the Commonwealth, on international 
recognition of Bangladesh 
18 April 1972 Bangladesh joins the Commonwealth, having gained 
independence from Pakistan in Dec. 1971. 
10 July 1973 The Bahamas joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
2 August 1973 The second Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
convenes in Ottawa. 
24 January 1974 The 1974 British Commonwealth Games opens in 
Christchurch. (The last time the Games’ name includes 
reference to Britain.) 
7 February 1974 Grenada joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
29 April 1975 The third Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting 
convenes in Kingston. 
1 July 1975 Guyana’s Shridath Ramphal succeeds Arnold Smith as 
Commonwealth Secretary General. 
16 September 1975 Papua New Guinea joins the Commonwealth upon being 
granted independence by the UK. 
29 June 1976 The Seychelles joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
8 June 1977 The fourth Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting 
convenes in London. 
The Gleneagles Declaration, discouraging sporting contacts 
with apartheid South Africa. 
7 July 1978 The Solomon Islands joins the Commonwealth upon being 
granted independence by the UK. 
3 August 1978 The 1978 Commonwealth Games open in Edmonton.  
1 October 1978 Tuvalu joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
3 November 1978 Dominica joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
12 July 1979 Kiribati joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
1 August 1979 The fifth Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
convenes in Lusaka. 
7 August 1979  The assembled Commonwealth Heads of Government issue 
the Lusaka Declaration, reaffirming the Commonwealth’s 
opposition to racism and discrimination on the grounds of 
gender, demanding legal equality of all people of the 
Commonwealth. 
September 1979 The Lancaster House conference convenes in London. 
27 October 1979 St Vincent and the Grenadines join the Commonwealth upon 
being granted independence by the UK. 
12 December 1979 Zimbabwe Rhodesia dissolves itself, returning power to the UK 
in preparation for recognised independence following multi-
party elections. 
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17 April 1980 Zimbabwe formal independence. 
1 July 1980 Shridath Ramphal begins his second term as Commonwealth 
Secretary General. 
1 October 1980 Zimbabwe joins the Commonwealth. 
30 July 1981 Vanuatu joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence from a French-UK condominium. 
21 September 1981 Belize joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
30 September 1981 The sixth Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
convenes in Melbourne. 
1 November 1981 Antigua and Barbuda joins the Commonwealth upon being 
granted independence by the UK. 
30 September 1982 The 1982 Commonwealth Games open in Brisbane. 
9 July 1983 The Maldives join the Commonwealth as a ‘Special Member’, 
upon being granted independence by the UK in 1965. 
19 September 1983 St Kitts and Nevis joins the Commonwealth upon being 
granted independence by the UK. 
25 October 1983 US invasion of Grenada, following Cuban trained troops’ 
assassination of  Prime Minister Maurice Bishop 
23 November 1983 The seventh Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
convenes in New Delhi. 
1 January 1984 Brunei joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by the UK. 
31 October 1984 PM Indira Gandhi assassinated.  
1 July 1985 Shridath Ramphal begins his third term as Commonwealth 
Secretary General. 
20 July 1985 The Maldives becomes a full member of the Commonwealth 
16 October 1985 The eighth Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting 
convenes in Nassau. 
Eminent Persons Group (February – May 1986) 
Malcolm Fraser (Australia) 
Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria) 
Dame Nita Barrow (Barbedos) 
Archbishop Edward Stott (Canada) 
Anthony Barber (Great Britain) 
John Malecela (Tanzania)  
Swaran Singh (India) 
24 July 1986 The 1986 Commonwealth Games open in Edinburgh. The 
Games are boycotted by 32 countries, including almost all 
African, Caribbean and Asian nations, in protest against the 
British government’s attitude to sport in apartheid South Africa. 
3 August 1986** The ninth Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting 
convenes in London. 
Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group Report formally 
presented. 
13 October 1987 The tenth Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting 
convenes in Vancouver (the first outside the host nation’s 
capital city.) 
15 October 1987 Fiji is suspended from the Commonwealth, after two coups 
d’etat 
29 September 1989 Cameroon applies for observer status in the Commonwealth, 
paving the way for its membership in 1995. 
1 October 1989 Pakistan rejoins the Commonwealth 
18 October 1989 The eleventh Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
convenes in Kuala Lumpur. 
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21 October 1989 The assembled Commonwealth Heads of Government issue 
the Langkawi Declaration, committing Commonwealth 
members to environmental sustainability. 
24 January 1990 The 1990 Commonwealth Games open in Auckland. 
21 March 1990 Namibia joins the Commonwealth upon being granted 
independence by South Africa. 
1990 Commonwealth Finance Ministers Meeting, Trinidad 
Launch of Commonwealth debt relief initiative  
1 July 1990 Nigeria’s Chief Emeka Anyaoku succeeds Shridath Ramphal 
as Commonwealth Secretary General. 
13 October 1991 The twelfth Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting 
convenes in Harare.  
At the conclusion, the assembled Commonwealth Heads of 
Government issue the Harare Declaration, adding the core 
principles and values of the core principles and values of the 
Commonwealth, detailing membership criteria, and redefining 
and reinforcing its purpose. (Along with the 1971 Singapore 
Declaration, it is considered one of the most important 
documents of the Commonwealth’s constitution.) 
21 October 1993 The thirteenth Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting 
convenes in Limassol. 
April 1994. Black majority rule in South Africa. South Africa rejoins the 
Commonwealth.  
Commonwealth Finance Ministers meeting, Malta 
Commonwealth debt relief initiative 
18 August 1994 The 1994 Commonwealth Games open in Victoria, Canada. 
The event marked South Africa’s return to the Games after a 
36 year absence. 
1 July 1995 Chief Emeka Anyaoku begins his second term as 
Commonwealth Secretary General. 
10 November 1995 The fourteenth Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
convenes in Auckland. 
12 November 1995 The assembled Commonwealth Heads of Government agree 
to the Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme on the 
Harare Declaration, designed to implement the Harare 
Declaration’s affirmation of the Commonwealth’s principles and 
membership criteria.  
Creation of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group 
(CMAG), set up to deal with persistent and serious violators of 
the Commonwealth’s shared principles. Nigeria suspended 
from the Commonwealth following the sentencing to death of 
writer and activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa and a group of fellow 
activists. 
(during 1990s CMAG meets twice a year, and deals with 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Pakistan, Fiji ,Solomon 
Islands, & Zimbabwe; Lesotho; Tanzania-Zanzibar; Swaziland; 
Guyana; Antigua/Barbuda.  
13 November 1995 Cameroon joins the Commonwealth (having been granted 
independence by France in 1960, and joined by the former 
British colony of South Cameroons in 1961.) 
Mozambique joins the Commonwealth, the first country without 
having had constitutional ties to an existing member. 
January 1996 CMAG failed attempts to visit Nigeria. 
March 1996 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Report on the 
Future of the Commonwealth (Conclusions and 
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Recommendations published in the Round Table, 339, July 
1996)  
Announcement that next CHOGM venue will be Edinburgh. 
GB announcement of 600,000 pledge to Commonwealth of 
Learning 
April 1996 Indian election. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao defeated.  
May 1996 BJP leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee sworn in as President, then 
resigned 13 days later. Devi Gowda formed government 
April-May 1996 Talks between coalition of Sierra Leone People’s Party 
(SLPP), PDP and DCP, and rebel Revolutionary United Front 
May 1996 Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia visit to Britain 
June 1996 Nigerian delegation, led by FM Tomi Ikimi, visit to London. 
CMAG meeting in London (Gambia and Nigeria on formal 
agenda) 
Referendum in Gambia 
July 1996 President Nelson Mandela visit to London. 
Launch of Commonwealth African Investment Fund 
September 1996 CMAG meeting in New York  
Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ meeting, Bermuda 
Proposals for HIPC 
IDA and other Bank/Fund issues 
Private capital flows 
Commonwealth Private Investment Initiative (CPII) 
Combatting Money Laundering 
November 1996 CMAG visit to Nigeria  
February 1997 African Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, 
Botswana 
CMAG meeting in London (Nigeria, the Gambia, Sierra Leone)
March 1997 Commonwealth Day Debate, House of Commons 
May 1997 British General Election.  
Labour Government under Prime Minister Tony Blair 
June 1997 Hong Kong returned to Chinese rule 
July 1997 CMAG meeting  
31 August 1997 Death of Diana, Princess of Wales  
September 1997 Commonwealth Finance Ministers Meeting, Mauritius 
(Globalization, HIPC, [the Mauritus Mandate], Promoting 
Private Capital Flows, Trade and Investment, CPII, Combatting 
Money Laundering.  
Gordon Brown (in one of first speeches as Chancellor) calls for 
wide spread relief of debt. 
1 October 1997 Fiji rejoins the Commonwealth, following adoption of a new 
constitution more in line with Commonwealth principles. 
22-23 October 1997  Commonwealth Business Forum, London
(attended by businesspeople, government officials and several 
heads of government)  
24 October 1997 The fifteenth Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
convenes in Edinburgh. 
26 October 1997 Retreat at St Andrews 
27 October 1997 At the conclusion, the assembled Heads of Government issue 
the Edinburgh Declaration, codifying the Commonwealth’s 
membership criteria. 
10 April 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA)  
11 September 1998 The 1998 Commonwealth Games open in Kuala Lumpur. The 
first games to be held in Asia. 
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29 May 1999 The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group lifts Nigeria’s 
suspension from the Commonwealth.  
18 October 1999 The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group suspends 
Pakistan from the Commonwealth with immediate effect. 
12 November 1999 The sixteenth Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting 
convenes in Durban. Thabo Mbeki becomes the first 
Commonwealth Chairperson-in-office.  
1999 Hong Kong reverts to PRC sovereignty. (continued 
participation in the Commonwealth Lawyers Association, the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, the Association of 
Commonwealth Universities, the Commonwealth Association 
of Legislative Counsels) 
1 April 2000 New Zealand’s Don McKinnon succeeds Chief Emeka 
Anyaoku as Commonwealth Secretary General 
6 June 2000 The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group partially 
suspends Fiji from the Commonwealth with immediate effect. 
28 September 2000 The Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting (due to 
convene in Brisbane on 6 October) is cancelled in the 
aftermath of the 11 September attacks in the US. 
20 December 2000 The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group lifts Fiji’s 
suspension from the Commonwealth, but keeps it on the 
agenda until the Supreme Court rules on the government’s 
constitutionality. 
2 March 2001 The seventeenth Commonwealth Heads of Government 
meeting convenes in Coolum, Australia. John Howard 
becomes Commonwealth Chairperson-in-office. 
October 2001 Visit by Commonwealth ministers to Zimbabwe. 
Announcement that Zimbabwe has done little to honour 
commitments to end the crisis over seizures of land. 
30 January 2002 The Ministerial Action Group approves General Musharaff’s 
roadmap for the October general election 
19 March 2002 After Commonwealth election observers report that 
Zimbabwe’s presidential election was rife with fraud and 
intimidation, the troika, led by John Howard, announces 
Zimbabwe’s immediate suspension from the Commonwealth. 
25 July 2002 The 2002 Commonwealth Games open in Manchester. 
5 December 2003 The eighteenth Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
convenes in Abuja, Nigeria. Olusegun Osabanjo becomes 
Commonwealth Chairperson-in-Office. 
Zimbabwe’s suspension extended indefinitely. 
Don McKinnon is re-elected as Commonwealth Secretary 
General in a competitive election by 40 votes to 11 votes, 
against Sri Lanka’s Lakshman Kadirgamar. 
7 December 2003 Robert Mugabe personally announces Zimbabwe’s immediate 
withdrawal from the Commonwealth, following his failure to 
have suspension lifted.  
8 December 2003 At the conclusion of the eighteenth CHOGM, the assembled 
Commonwealth Heads of Government issue the Aso Rock 
Declaration, reaffirming the Commonwealth’s commitment to 
the Harare Declaration. 
22 May 2004 The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group lifts Pakistan’s 
suspension from the Commonwealth with immediate effect. 
7 April 2005 the International Organisations Act 2005 is passed in the UK, 
amending the Commonwealth Secretariat Act 1966. 
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25 November 2005 The nineteenth Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
convenes in Valletta,  Malta. Lawrence Gonzi becomes 
Commonwealth Chairperson-in-Office. 
15 March 2006 The 2006 Commonwealth Games open in Melbourne. 
8 December 2006 The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group suspends Fiji 
from the Commonwealth with immediate effect. 
24 October 2007 The committee on Commonwealth Membership makes 
recommendations on changes to the membership criteria of 
the Commonwealth. 
22 November 2007 The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group suspends 
Pakistan from the Commonwealth with immediate effect, 
following President Musharraf’s declaration of a state of 
emergency and sacking of top judges. 
23 November 2007 The twentieth Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
convenes in Kampala. Yoweri Museveni becomes 
Commonwealth Chairperson-in-office. 
1 April 2008 Kamalesh Sharma succeeds Don McKinnon as 
Commonwealth Secretary General. 
22 May 2008 The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group lifts Pakistan’s 
suspension from the Commonwealth with immediate effect. 
1 September 2009 Fiji’s suspension is increased to full suspension, following a 
failure to commit to the restoration of electoral government by 
2010. 
27 November 2009 The twenty-first commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
convenes in Port of Spain. Patrick Manning becomes 
Commonwealth Chairperson-in-Office. 
Rwanda joins the Commonwealth after applying for 
membership in 2008. (in recognition of its ‘tremendous 
progress’ since the 1994 genocide.) 
Eminent Persons Group (EPG) membership:  
Dr Emmanuel O Akewety (Ghana) 
Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (Malaysia, 
Chairperson) 
Mrs Patricia Francis (Jamaica) 
Dr Asma Jahangir (Pakistan) 
Mr Samuel Kavuma (Uganda) 
The Hon Michael Kirby (Australia) 
Dr Graca Machel (Mozambique) 
Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind (UK) 
Sir Ron Sanders (Guyana) 
Senator Hugh Segal (Canada) 
Sir Ieremia Tabai (Kiribati) 
26 May 2010 Kamla Persad-Bissessar becomes Prime Minister of Trinidad 
and Tobago, and thus succeeds Patrick Manning as 
Commonwealth Chairperson-in-Office.  
3 October 2010 The 2010 Commonwealth Games open in Delhi. 
28 October 2011 The twenty-second Commonwealth Heads of Government 
meeting convenes in Perth. Julia Gillard becomes 
Commonwealth Chairperson in Office.  
November 2011 The British Parliament’s Foreign Affairs select committee 
recommends better representation for Crown Dependencies 
such as the Channel Islands in the Commonwealth. 
January 2012 The Commonwealth calls for credible elections in Fiji, after 
General Voreqe Bainimarama announces plan to end martial 
rule and to hold elections in 2014. Fiji remains suspended from 
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the Commonwealth and is the subject of international 
sanctions.  
2012 Australian Prime Minister makes statement in Parliament: 
2013 The controversial twenty-third Commonwealth Heads of 
Government meeting convenes in Columbo, Sri Lanka 
2015 Commonwealth Games open in Glasgow 
November 2015 The twenty-fourth Commonwealth heads meeting opens in 
Valetta, Malta. 
Patricia Scotland is elected Secretary General, against 
Commonwealth Deputy Secretary General Msasekgoa Masire-
Mwamba,  and Sir Ronald Sanders 
April 2018 Commonwealth Games open at the Gold Coast, Australia 
April 2018 Commonwealth summit, London 
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Issues for Discussion 
The following list is indicative of the broad areas we are hoping will be commented 
upon by participants during the witness seminar: 
1. The role and input and engagement of the British Government under Prime
Minister Rt Hon John Major to the Commonwealth.
2. The decision for Britain to host the 1997 summit in Edinburgh.
3. The attitude of the British Labour party to the Commonwealth before coming to
office.
4. The 1997 Election, and Labour in office:
o The place of the Commonwealth in Labour’s ‘ethicial’ foreign policy
o Labour and the Commonwealth:
o Personalities and Policies (the attitude and approach of
Prime Minister Rt Hon Tony Blair, Foreign Secretary
Robin Cook)
o A Revitalized Commonwealth?
o The Queen’s tour of Pakistan and India
5. The importance of Commonwealth developments:
The work of CMAG (Sierra Leone, Nigeria, The Gambia) 
Soundings from potential new members 
6. Preparations for the summit:
Official motif: Trade, Investment and Development 
7. The Commonwealth summit
• policy issues
• trade and investment
• commodity-dependent countries
• impact of globalization on low-income countries
• sustainable pathways out of debt
• Membership criteria
Applications from Yemen, Rwanda and Palestinian National 
Authority 
• Proposed aid programmes
• Trade and Investment Access Facility
• Commonwealth Training Centre
• Simplification of customs procedures
• Commonwealth Export Training centres
• Launch of South Asia Regional Fund (part of Commonwealth Private
Investment Initiative, [CDC/Commonwealth Secretariat)
• CMAG reports (Nigeria, Sierra Leone)
• the distraction of other issues in British foreign policy and party politics: EMU
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8. The Retreat (St Andrews)
9. The Edinburgh Economic Declaration.
10. The Edinburgh summit and the Queen.
11. Role of Commonwealth NGOs in Edinburgh
11. The Commonwealth summit and the Press.
12. Aftermath
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Discussion 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Ladies and gentlemen, honoured speakers and honoured guests, it gives me great 
pleasure to welcome you to the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at Senate House. 
I am Sue Onslow, acting Director of the Institute, and it is my pleasure to chair this 
event on ‘Britain in the Commonwealth: the 1997 Edinburgh Commonwealth Heads 
of Government Meeting (CHOGM).’ 
It gives me great pleasure to welcome those who were closely involved in the 
planning – both political and logistical – within the British Government, within the 
Commonwealth Secretariat and, critically, within the non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) sector in the run-up to CHOGM. As we face the Commonwealth summit 
which will be held in London next month, it is worth remembering that the Edinburgh 
heads’ meeting was the last time Britain hosted such an event. I think that we will all 
identify many echoes from the context of the Edinburgh meeting, which are still 
relevant to this day – the background of Europe, the background of problems within 
the Commonwealth, debates about its revitalisation, debates about membership, and 
debates about the headship – which were all there in the 1997 summit. 
This was, of course, the first summit which had a prearranged motif of economics, 
which had been agreed before the incoming Labour government under Tony Blair, 
elected in May 1997.  We will be covering the transitional arrangements from the 
John Major government into the new Blair administration, and then the summit itself. 
It gives me great pleasure to welcome here around this table Sir John Holmes, who 
then was PPS to the Prime Minister.  He first joined Prime Minister John Major’s 
office in Downing Secretary as his Private Secretary, Overseas Affairs, and 
Diplomatic Adviser at the beginning of 1996. He continued in this role under Prime 
Minister Tony Blair from 1997 to 1999, becoming his PPS, and was a key figure in 
the negotiation of the Good Friday Agreement; consequently he had a particularly 
close view of the important backdrop of British domestic political debates in the run 
up to, and at the time of the Edinburgh summit. 
I also welcome Mr Martin Hatfull, who was then Head of the Commonwealth 
Coordination Department at the FCO.  Mr Hatfull is a former British diplomat, and 
recently stepped down as Director of International Public Affairs at Diageo.  Formerly 
on the UK-India Business Council, he is currently Vice Chair of the UK-ASEAN 
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Business Council. Mr Hatfull joined the FCO in 1980 and rose to become Minister at 
the British Embassy in Tokyo between 2003-2008 and also served as Ambassador to 
Indonesia. 
In 1997 Mr Stuart Mole, on my left, was Director and Head of the Office of the 
Commonwealth Secretary General, Chief Emeka Anyaoku.  Stuart Mole had joined 
the Secretariat in the early 1980s and, by this point, along with my other colleague, 
Mr Amitav Banerji, was – I hesitate to use the word – a veteran of CHOGMs, which 
was very important in terms of their detailed knowledge and experience in the 
framing, assistance and planning of these summits.  After serving at the Secretariat, 
Mr Mole later became Director of the RCS between 2000 and 2008. 
Mr Amitav Banerji, in 1997, was Deputy Conference Secretary at the Commonwealth 
Secretariat.  He later became Chief of Staff to Secretary General Don McKinnon.  He 
also served as Director of the Political Affairs Department and is now Project Director 
at the Global Leadership Foundation. 
Ms Prunella Scarlett, then Director of Commonwealth Affairs at the RCS, will be 
speaking about the very important role of NGOs at the Edinburgh summit, giving the 
background context, the organisation and the multidimensional aspects of the 
Commonwealth and the innovation of including civil society. 
I am delighted also to welcome to this table, not as a ‘late entry’ but as a very 
welcome addition to the discussion, Ms Anji Hunter, then Personal Assistant to Prime 
Minister Tony Blair. 
Thank you very much indeed, honoured guests. 
If I may provide a brief framework to our discussion: witness seminars are organised 
as an interactive discussion.  These are not intended as the occasion for delivering 
long speeches, but rather for each participant to talk to the others, to interrogate 
recollections and to stimulate our memories.  I am sorry that Dr Moses Anafu, 
formerly in the Political Affairs Department and Deputy Conference Secretary in 
1997, cannot be with us today.  I am also very sorry that Sir Richard Dales, then 
Director, Africa and the Commonwealth, FCO, is similarly unable to attend. However, 
he has kindly sent a memorandum of his recollections, which are as follows: 
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Sir Richard Dales 
I took up my post (at the time designated Assistant Under Secretary of State for 
Africa and the Commonwealth) in late 1995, and thus inherited the decision to hold 
the 1997 CHOGM in Edinburgh. My recollections of both the preparations for the 
Conference and the event itself are very sketchy. This is partly a consequence of the 
lapse of time and my age, but also of the fact that the bulk of the work in the FCO 
was done by the excellent teams of the Commonwealth Coordination Department, 
who coordinated the contribution from the departments dealing with economic policy, 
trade and development etc and of the Conference Section of Protocol Department 
who took care of the logistical arrangements. In addition, events in Africa were a 
constant preoccupation for me. That’s my excuse anyway.  
Policy and Agenda Preparations 
John Major’s Conservative Government was in office. Malcolm Rifkind was Secretary 
of State and Lynda Chalker, Minister of State covering Africa and the 
Commonwealth. The Conservative Party had a reputation for regarding the 
Commonwealth as a bit of a nuisance, a forum in which the former colonies could 
pillory the ex-colonial power and beg for more aid. This attitude was not reflected in 
the government. The Commonwealth was still named separately in the title of the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, a separate Department in the FCO covered 
Commonwealth affairs (like the departments covering the EU and the UN etc). 
Ministers probably saw the main benefit of the Commonwealth as lying in the way its 
multiplicity of NGO and groupings (such as judges) provided a means of upholding 
its values. But it also provided a forum bringing together a third of the countries in the 
world and thus a means for Britain to project its policies. At the same time, ministers 
were well aware of the importance of avoiding appearing to treat the Commonwealth 
as a useful poodle internationally.  
The CHOGM was therefore a major opportunity for the UK. It was going to take place 
soon before the UK assumed the Presidency of the EU (first half of 1998) and the 
Chairmanship of the G10. A complication in preparing the agenda and intended 
outcome of the CHOGM was that a British General Election was expected before the 
end of 1997. Opinion polls made it seem likely that Labour would come into office. 
We therefore had to ensure that British objectives were supported by both major 
parties. Ensuring that all the preparations for the CHOGM would survive a change of 
government was a major preoccupation for me. It was decided early on that the 
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principal British objectives should be to get the Commonwealth to sign up to policies 
to remove barriers to trade and investment, a major foreign policy objective at the 
time but also one which was likely to be shared by Labour and LibDems. Discreet 
contacts tended to confirm this. Another strategic objective was action on 
environmental protection.  
These policy issues were not the sole preserve of the Commonwealth Coordination 
Department, or even the FCO, so the coordination across Whitehall and with the 
Commonwealth Secretariat was a major undertaking. However, I recall the 
Secretariat as being supportive, while emphasising the importance of making sure 
that the benefits of liberalisation would extend to the poorer and smaller countries. 
The all-important preparatory meeting of Senior Officials was constructive as we 
were able to be sympathetic to suggestions that the trade and investment policy we 
hoped would emerge from the CHOGM should include measures to protect the 
interests of small states. (The more difficult issue was how to achieve this, but I do 
not remember how it was resolved.) Britain also shared the serious concerns that 
several Commonwealth countries, especially in the Pacific, were threatened by rising 
sea levels and needed special attention in international negotiations on 
environmental protection. It was a useful supporting argument in international 
negotiations.  
Internal Politics  
Labour distinguished itself from the Conservatives in expressing a certain 
enthusiasm for the Commonwealth as an institution with the implication that a Labour 
Government in office would pay more attention to it. Discreet enquiries suggested 
that Labour would support the British proposals for the CHOGM. (In my view the 
differences between the two parties were purely presentational and not substantial-
as indeed with Robin Cook’s so-called “ethical foreign policy”. There were no 
significant changes in the execution of policy with the change of government, as 
regards either the Commonwealth or ethics.)  
I was naturally concerned to ensure that the new Labour Government was in full 
agreement with both the policy issues and the arrangements for the CHOGM. I was 
advised by one of my political contacts that to ensure the Prime Minister’s support I 
had to get myself accepted by two lady “gate-keepers” at No 10, both of whom I 
arranged to consult. When I was summoned to brief Tony Blair (the first time was 
fairly early on) I found him well up on what we were proposing and receptive to 
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suggestions. I remember nothing of substance, but I do remember coming away from 
the meeting feeling with great relief that the PM was on board. He was also very 
much aware of the special opportunity to promote British interests offered by the co-
incidence of the CHOGM, EU Presidency and G10 chairmanship within a six month 
period.  
I should mention that Robin Cook took remarkably little interest in the preparations 
for the CHOGM (or indeed in the Commonwealth). Baroness Symons, a junior FCO 
Minister, had responsibility for the Commonwealth. She took a particular interest in 
the logistical arrangements.  
CMAG  
We regarded CMAG as a useful committee. I do not remember the issue of Asian 
membership as a major preoccupation for the Committee (or Britain) as it hit straight 
at the rivalry between India and Pakistan and no-one wanted both!  
Lynda Chalker had been a very active participant in CMAG meetings and although 
there were mutterings from some other members that the Secretary of State should 
attend in person, I do not re-member whether either Malcolm Rifkind or Robin Cook 
ever attended.  
Commonwealth Membership  
A subsidiary British objective for the CHOGM was to get the Commonwealth to take 
a stance on Nigeria (then under Sonny Abacha), the Gambia,  Sierra Leone and to 
adopt the recommendations of CMAG on criteria for Commonwealth Membership. 
Mandela had railroaded the previous CHOGM into accepting Mozambique as a 
member, which had no British connections whatsoever. Rwanda and the PLO were 
now seeking to join. The PLO was not eligible as it was not a state, but Rwanda was 
in the hands of an English- speaking regime which had grown up in exile in Uganda 
and come to power with a huge tide of sympathy after a bloody ethnic conflict only 
three years be-fore the CHOGM. The UK was determined to stop the expansion to 
countries which had no experience of “Commonwealth values”. It was hard enough 
making sure that all existing members put into practice the concepts of the Harare 
Declaration. Even the proposed criteria would in theory al-low Iraq, Libya and 
Palestine to apply, but the last thing anybody wanted was the exposure of the 
Commonwealth to the intractable problems of the Middle East. My recollection is that 
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the UK and its allies fended off the new applications, but I recall the look of extreme 
annoyance on Mandela’s face when his attempt to admit the PLO (I am not sure 
about Rwanda) was thwarted. I think it may have been the first time that he had been 
overruled. He was evidently not used to failing to get his way.  
Logistics 
The first CHOGM I attended was in Kingston, Jamaica, in 1975. (I was an Assistant 
Private Secretary to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, James Callaghan.) It 
lasted over a week. The CHOGM of 1977 (which I also attended part of) was only 
slightly shorter. Both included an away-weekend, when Heads of Government and 
Foreign Ministers gathered separately in informal surroundings without officials. By 
the 1990’s no British Prime Minister could afford to devote so long to one meeting 
(and nor could many other Heads of Government) given the multiplicity of 
international meetings of that period. Moreover, the whole weekend Retreat away 
from the conference centre had become more difficult, both because of the need for 
suitably prestigious hotel accommodation for over fifty Heads of Government and 
because the increase in the number of Commonwealth members had made the 
informality of the weekend very difficult to achieve. The 1997 meeting was therefore 
not only cut down to 4 days, Friday to Monday, but the Retreat was turned into a day 
trip. I remember that this caused resentment among some countries but that Britain 
would make no concession. I cannot remember whether the 4 day meeting was 
decided upon by Mr Major or by Mr Blair, but I believe that the decision not to stay a 
night away on Retreat was taken by Mr Blair, because of the difficulties of finding 
suitable hotel accommodation for such large numbers outside Edinburgh. At one time 
we were considering having the Retreat in Edinburgh, so that no-one would have to 
move. In the end we decided upon St Andrews to which a special train took all 
participants. The journey would be easier to organise than having masses of cars 
trying to get out of Edinburgh and the travelling time could form part of the Retreat. It 
did not work. There were quite a few critical mutterings on that train!  
The logistical arrangements for the CHOGM were in the hands of the FCO’s 
Conference Section. I went early on the Edinburgh to look at the facilities and to 
establish links with the Scottish civil servants in Edinburgh who would have to help 
with much of the preparatory work. Police and security, car hire firms, hotels, press 
arrangements and ultimately provision of separate facilities for the Business and 
NGO forums which (I think) ran in parallel. Soon after Labour came into Government, 
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I went again, with Baroness Symons, to check that all the arrangements made by 
that time were right. Conference Section were very effective in coordinating all the 
different aspects of logistics. They recruited a businessman to help with contract 
negotiations covering everything from hotels to freebies (the memento packs, of 
varying value, given to all delegates. I still have my CHOGM 1997 ballpoint!!) I 
chaired coordination meetings attended by different departments to ensure that all 
the boxes were ticked on both the substance of the meeting and the arrangements. I 
am fairly sure that we came in on budget.  
The logistical arrangements were extremely difficult because none of the facilities 
were really big enough for such a large meeting of VIPs. Even the (new) Conference 
Centre was a tight fit. But there was no question of moving the venue from 
Edinburgh. I remember negative comments from some Commonwealth officials who I 
think thought that we had done the CHOGM on the cheap. There was of course 
never any question of building a special Commonwealth village on a par with 
Mobutu’s OAU village in Kinshasa, where each OAU head of Government had their 
own villa to stay in at an OAU Summit! 
Dr Sue Onslow 
I would now like to invite Sir John Holmes to begin. Sir John, what are your 
recollections around the decision to hold the summit in the UK, the attitude of Prime 
Minister John Major, and your memory of events as the summit itself approached? 
Sir John Holmes 
Thank you very much, Sue, and thank you very much for the invitation.  As I said to 
you right at the beginning, this is coloured by the fact that my memory of the detail of 
this event is limited, although refreshed by the documents you have sent round; so a 
certain amount of secondary reconstruction may have gone on from my memory, but 
let us hope not too much. 
I thought that what I would do is not really talk, certainly in this introductory bit, about 
much detail but just talk about the general context in which the event was happening 
from, first of all, John Major’s point of view and then Tony Blair’s point of view.  
Forgive me if I am slightly brutal at times about it. 
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The first point to make is to put a Commonwealth summit into the general context of 
a prime minister’s diary.  Any prime minister these days – and certainly in those days 
as well – is incredibly busy, trying to do several jobs at once – being prime minister, 
keeping their party going, keeping the House of Commons going and so on – with a 
large number of international obligations which, to some extent, in a prime minister’s 
view, get in the way of the real business of governing their own country. 
There are a large number of summits on the agenda in any one year, and I would 
say that CHOGM is the most pleasant but possibly the least substantive of those; 
therefore, that is the way in which a prime minister would approach it and, not of their 
own volition, necessarily, take a huge interest in it until it happens and they have to 
be there and deal with it.  Of course, it has a lot of ancillary advantages: it is a great 
place to meet a lot of leaders in one place and in a way in which you cannot do at 
other summits such as European or NATO summits.  This is a much broader 
gathering, a bit like the United Nations, in a way, so that is an attraction of any 
CHOGM. 
The job of someone like me was always to try to make sure that there was enough 
focus from the prime minister – whether it was John Major or Tony Blair – on what 
was going to be an important public event and to make sure that they had enough 
input into it and that they were happy with the way the preparations were going.  That 
is the general approach to it. 
As far as John Major was concerned, by the time I got there, the decision to hold a 
meeting in the UK had been taken significantly before that, but the serious 
preparations were just beginning.  Just to put it into the context of John Major’s 
thinking about it: although he would not have said it in quite this way, he would have 
had a pretty good idea that he was not going to be at the heads’ meeting.  Although 
he was hoping to win the election, the chances of that, even at 18 months out, did 
not look particularly bright, so that, no doubt, would have coloured his attitude. So 
one just needs to have that in mind too. 
At the same time, of course, he wanted it to be done properly – to be a well-run 
summit with some good themes and some good substance in it.  That is the point 
which I recall most strongly: this desire from John Major downwards that this should 
be a substantive summit, with some meat to the agenda which was not just the usual 
declarations of values.  Commonwealth summits in the past had been completely 
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dominated by subjects like South Africa, which was no longer on the agenda in the 
same way, although there were other issues of a similar nature, perhaps.  There 
was, then, a desire to say, ‘Can we use the Commonwealth for something else and 
focus it on something else?’ - hence the idea of a summit very much focused on 
economic issues.  Trade and investment was an initial wish and it was necessary to 
add development to that later, because that was a preoccupation of most of the 
Commonwealth members, which was not a problem. 
That was the wish: to focus it on that.  I am not going to talk about the logistics of it 
because that goes for itself, but there was a number of meetings that I was involved 
in with the Commonwealth people in the FCO about how we should organise this, 
about how we should make sure that this focus trade and investment and 
development was there, what we could get out of it, and what the traps, problems 
and opportunities were.  That was what was happening in John Major’s time; of 
course, he disappeared five months before it happened.  As the time approached, it 
became more and more obvious that he was not going to win the election, and it 
became more and more problematic to run the government as a whole.  It was a very 
difficult end-of-government period after 18 years of Conservatives in power and the 
lack of a majority etc, so his own personal attention to the summit, I think, was pretty 
limited.  That, then, was the Major approach to it in general, without trying to get into 
too much detail. 
When Tony Blair arrived on 1 May, again you need to remember the context, which 
is sometimes a bit hard to believe now.  This was a time when Tony Blair could walk 
on water, as far as the electorate was concerned; and he was a prime minister with 
huge self-confidence in his own ability to reach agreement on almost anything.  
There was, as your papers bring out, a Labour commitment to the Commonwealth.  If 
I am honest, however, I do not think I could say that Tony Blair’s commitment to the 
Commonwealth was particularly obvious – not that he was against it at all but it was 
not something that was foremost in his thoughts.  If the Commonwealth bits were 
there – and Anji can correct me if I am wrong – it was probably more because of 
Robin Cook than it was because of Tony Blair.  If you look at his record, he did his 
stuff at the Commonwealth when he had to but, I was looking at his autobiography a 
couple of days ago and, if you look in the back index for ‘Commonwealth’, you will 
not find it, and that is perhaps not an accident. 
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At the same time, he wanted to make a success of this meeting – it was an important 
that the UK was hosting, and there was the commitment to the Commonwealth – and 
to be a more positive supporter of the Commonwealth than the Conservatives had 
been; so there was an obvious incentive from that point of view to make a success of 
it.  He wanted to make a success of everything.  Since everything was new, there 
was an opportunity to do different and new things and to get some positive press 
interest in it.  Getting the British press interested in the Commonwealth is always an 
uphill struggle but he was certainly very keen to do that, if he possibly could, and I 
think that coloured his attitude to the approach to the summit.  I think he was happy 
that there was this economic focus that fitted with the agenda and with the idea of 
putting some substance into it, if at all possible, and not just having the usual political 
arguments.  He was particularly interested in the global-trade side, which was a bit 
controversial, as we will, no doubt, come to later, but also in Nigeria and the issues 
that that was causing at the time. 
It was a job to get him to focus on Commonwealth summit before it happened, and 
that is particularly also because there were some very big issues preoccupying him 
at the time in the run-up to that, including learning how to be a prime minister, apart 
from anything else.  Northern Ireland was a constant preoccupation throughout this 
time and went on for many years after that, and was much in mind.  The particular 
preoccupation in the run-up to the summit and during the summit itself was the 
argument about the European currency: whether we should join and what we should 
say about that.  It is not a secret that there was a lot of disagreement between him 
and Gordon Brown about this.  There was a huge amount of negotiation that had 
been going on for weeks – indeed, months – about what sort of statement should be 
made about that, culminating in the statement which Gordon Brown made on the 
Monday immediately after the summit. 
His mind was very much on that all that time, because this was a huge existential 
issue for the UK.  It is something to which he was committed but knew that there 
were huge problems with.  As I say, there was a disagreement with Gordon Brown 
about it, which was also concerning.  Again, you just need to have that context firmly 
in mind when you are thinking about the Edinburgh meeting. 
Perhaps the last bit of context is the relationship with Robin Cook, which was not 
always the easiest relationship.  Robin Cook had announced a new foreign policy 
approach – I am not sure how new it was, to be honest, but it was called a new 
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foreign policy approach, and it was labelled by Robin Cook an ‘ethical’ foreign policy.  
Tony Blair did not want foreign policy to be unethical but his approach was more 
pragmatic, so he was not particularly bought-in to the new, ethical nature of foreign 
policy.  He wanted to make sure that we were defending British interests in perhaps 
a more pragmatic way than that label would have implied, so, again, that was 
somewhere in the background of the relationships going on at the time of the summit. 
That, then, is by way of introduction, if I may. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Thank you very much indeed, Sir John.  Mr Hatfull, how does this correspond to your 
own recollections in terms of the focus and attention of the Prime Minister and 
engagement with your own Department? 
Martin Hatfull 
It corresponds very well.  My perspective on it was different from John’s because of 
the different role that I was doing.  Perhaps just to set a bit of personal context: I was 
appointed to the role as Head of Commonwealth Coordination Department in late 
1996, so about a year out from the summit itself.  I was appointed on promotion, and 
the relevance of that is that, normally, to be honest, the job of Head of 
Commonwealth Coordination Department would not have been one which would 
have been terribly attractive to a reasonably ambitious, youngish diplomat in the 
FCO, because normally it was seen as very much of a backwater.  However, it was 
because it was CHOGM that it was set up as something which was an opportunity to 
be involved in something which was of real significance and importance to the 
Government, who wanted, as John was saying, to have a substantive summit. 
There was also already at that stage a recognition of the need to try to reinvigorate 
not necessarily the Commonwealth but the UK’s relationship with the 
Commonwealth.  That reflected partly a difficult relationship between the UK and the 
Commonwealth – or a relationship which was difficult at times – which I think was a 
reflection of the concerns which many members of the Commonwealth had about 
Prime Minister Thatcher’s views on apartheid South Africa, and that that coloured a 
lot of Commonwealth member states’ attitudes to the UK.  The FCO had difficulty 
knowing how to cope with that, to some extent. 
John touched on the difficulties of the Major administration at the time, and certainly, 
working in the FCO at that time, one was very aware of that.  I came to my role from 
a job in one of the EU departments, and we had had, during the course of 1996, the 
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bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)-related beef ban, the policy of non-
cooperation with the EU, and John Major being in hock to a few extreme right-wing 
Conservatives like Teddy Taylor and others.  The whole atmosphere was very 
difficult, so there was no sense of a dynamic foreign policy being executed at that 
time. 
In addition, in March 1996, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons 
published a very important report on the future of the Commonwealth, which was 
very critical of the Government’s approach to the Commonwealth, essentially arguing 
that it was neglecting an important asset.  Already, by the time that I came into my 
job, there was a determination on the part of the FCO to try to respond to that by 
demonstrating not only a commitment to make a successful CHOGM but to try to use 
the Commonwealth more effectively as part of the UK’s foreign policy. 
To some extent, the motivation for that was more to do with trying to deflect further 
criticism from Parliament, rather than any substantive foreign-policy objective.  
Certainly, in the tail end of the Major administration, I do not really recollect any close 
attention on CHOGM preparations from Malcolm Rifkind or other FCO ministers, with 
the exception of Lynda Chalker, who was interested.  The then Permanent Secretary, 
John Coles, was also quite focused on CHOGM preparations. 
John touched on the fact that the major decisions in terms of location, format and 
theme etc had already been taken, and I think, insofar as the business forum was 
concerned and also the separate dedicated centre for the NGOs at CHOGM, my 
recollection is that those decisions had been taken in principle but were still to be 
sorted in terms of the detail of the practicalities.  During the last few months of the 
Major administration, my main focus was, first of all, on learning about the 
Commonwealth, because I knew absolutely nothing about the Commonwealth when I 
took the job.  That is also indicative because I had done a range of different jobs in 
the FCO by that stage, but I think there were very few people working in the FCO 
who understood the Commonwealth or had more than a passing knowledge of it.  It 
is an extremely complex organism rather than an organisation, and so trying to get 
my head around that was the main preoccupation. 
In terms of trying to get staff and resources, the Commonwealth Coordination 
Department, when I joined it, was about four people.  Trying to build that up into a 
team which could be the core of a team which would manage the summit, with other 
departments like the Conference Department at the FCO and other bits of the 
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Government machinery that we were also able to draw on, was a big preoccupation, 
just in terms of getting the staff in place.  Clearly, making a start on the practical 
arrangements, we knew that there was an election coming and that, therefore, there 
was no point in trying to start to fine-tune things such as hotels and transport 
arrangements.  At that stage, it was not possible anyway that far out from the 
summit. 
There was also quite a lot of non-CHOGM-related stuff that still had to be dealt with.  
There was an issue over the future of the Commonwealth Institute, for example.  
There were all the routine issues to do with the Commonwealth Finance Committee 
and the relationships with the Commonwealth Secretariat and so on. 
When the Labour Government came in, my recollection is that it was, within the FCO, 
widely welcomed because it offered an opportunity for a fresh start.  There were 
difficulties in the FCO, as elsewhere, initially over Labour ministers’ suspicions about 
bureaucrats who they expected to be tainted by years of Thatcherism, but one got 
over that.  From the Commonwealth’s point of view, my sense was that there was a 
great sense of goodwill towards to the Labour Government, precisely because it was 
the flipside of the concerns about Thatcher’s views on apartheid and the fact that the 
Labour Party had been such a strong supporter of the anti-apartheid movement.  
That alone stood it in quite a lot of credit. 
John touched on the fact that the new Government was happy with the economic 
focus and the broad arrangements for CHOGM, and also repeated that desire to be 
clearer about what the Commonwealth was for and what its economic role was.  
There was also a relationship there to the ethical foreign policy; for example, trying to 
get a stronger role for the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) so that it 
was effective in implementing the principles in the Harare Declaration in relation to 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone and elsewhere was a concern.  Subsequently, that was a 
matter of some discussion with Commonwealth members. 
As we approached the summit itself, I was juggling administration and logistics – 
things like liaising with the two different police forces in Scotland who were involved, 
as well as with colleagues in the Commonwealth Secretariat and other bits of 
Government – as well as, from a policy point of view, trying to keep an oversight of 
what was happening with the developing economic declaration and the developing 
communiqué etc.  There is an extraordinary Christmas tree, especially in the report 
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of the Committee of the Whole, which gets endorsed by ministers with an incredible 
number of different Commonwealth organisations and bodies of one sort or another 
that need to be recognised in some form in the CHOGM communiqué. 
That was the antithesis of the sense that we got from Anji and colleagues in Number 
10, which was a desire to make CHOGM something which was identifiably an 
achievement for the Prime Minister in particular.  That was increasingly evident as 
we got closer to the date, and I remember a number of meetings with Anji, Magi 
Cleaver and, on occasion, Alastair Campbell and others on a range of things like the 
logo, the branding, the video, the new orchestration of the national anthem and all of 
that sort of stuff around the production, if you like, of the event, which Number 10, 
understandably, placed a lot of importance on.  It was not only that, however; it was 
also, as I said earlier, a renewed focus on trying to establish an identity for the 
Commonwealth: ‘Why are we doing all this?’  It is because it is important for the 
world economy and for development, and also for education.  One of the things that 
is sometimes overlooked is the stuff on the Commonwealth of Learning, and that was 
an important focus as we prepared. 
Those, then, are my impressionistic recollections, at this distance, of the preparations 
for the summit. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Thank you very much, Mr Hatfull.  Ms Hunter, if I could ask you at this particular point 
in the flow of the conversation, for your particular recollections of how quickly – if at 
all – Prime Minister Tony Blair came to understand the Commonwealth as a complex 
organism rather than as an organisation? And if you could comment on his 
relationship with Robin Cook?  It is often said that personalities in politics are very 
important.  Robin Cook had recently been involved in a very controversial tour of the 
Queen to Pakistan and to India, which had created a lot of attention in the press – it 
had been a point of real friction with the Indian Government around the issue of 
Kashmir.  Could you add any light on those two different aspects?   
Anji Hunter 
If I could just recollect something that both of these gentlemen have touched on: the 
election that year, was held on 1 May 1997. So we went in [to No 10] on 2 May and 
there had been, as John said, 18 years of Conservative rule.  There was this sense, 
you will recall, in 1997 of youth, vigour and excitement about our administration 
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coming in.  You say that you had been planning for a change of government. I can 
absolutely promise you that we never expected to win in the way that we did and with 
that huge majority.  We did not.  We entered on 2 May, and I remember walking into 
Downing Street.  We were somewhat in a state of shock at entering No. 10 in any 
event.  At the risk of sounding sycophantic in this company, the one thing you know 
when you get into Downing Street is you just say, ‘Thank you, God, for our civil 
servants’.  You do have a Rolls Royce machine and operation in Downing Street – 
these guys and the Cabinet Secretary – and you know you are in the hands of 
people who really know how to do things properly, which is what we wanted to do.  
We were not like this current Labour Party – we were New Labour and we were pro-
business, pro-monarchy and pro-the establishment. 
I remember, in my first or second week, being called in to the Cabinet Room.  The 
Prime Minister was sitting there, and I think Sir Robin Butler, the Cabinet Secretary, 
was sitting opposite him.  John was also in there, as was the Foreign Secretary, 
Robin Cook.  If it is okay with you, I will refer to Tony Blair as ‘Tony’.  Tony said, ‘I 
have just been informed that we have four massive events coming up over the next 
year.  We have CHOGM’.  I did not even know what ‘CHOGM’ meant.  He said, ‘We 
have to host the Commonwealth in October.  In April, we have the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM).  In May, we have the G8 in Birmingham.  Then we have the 
European summit in Cardiff in June’.  He said to me, ‘You are going to the point 
person on all of this with the FCO’.  You can imagine that I was in a state of shock at 
that. 
Robin and the Prime Minister had an odd relationship.  We had always thought that 
Robin was more from the left wing of the party and we always thought he was what 
we called ‘tricksy’: you were never quite sure with him.  However, they had mutual 
respect for each other.  There was no question about that.  I have to say Tony was 
not mad keen on the ethical foreign policy – not, as John says, that he was for an 
unethical foreign policy, but just to raise it up in this sort of ‘Of course we are going to 
have an ethical foreign policy, and of course our people in the FCO are going to 
behave in an ethical way’.  He was slightly suspicious of the Foreign Secretary on 
that but they worked together – there was no question about that – and they worked 
together perfectly well, often with the help of the officials that would smooth the 
waters between them. 
We were sitting in this room and the Foreign Secretary said, ‘If you are having your 
person involved in this, I want my person involved in it too’.  We were just waiting to 
32 
see whom he suggested, and he suggested Baroness Symons, who was a very good 
person because she was emollient and very respectful of her colleagues and her 
officials in the Department.  I knew she would work really well with us: she was ‘one 
of us’, as they say. 
We were set to work on these four events, the first of which was CHOGM.  It is true 
that the Prime Minister was not anti the Commonwealth.  He did not know much 
about it but he was keen to find out about it.  When he found out that this was going 
to be the biggest one that had ever been, with 48 countries represented, 20 of which 
all had new leaders, he felt he was amongst a new group of people too.  It was not 
just us being new; they were all new. 
I do not know if you recall but there was this thing called ‘Cool Britannia’, which we 
had not invented.  I absolutely promise it was not a phrase of ours.  Cool Britannia 
was on the front of Time magazine.  Ben & Jerry’s had an ice-cream called Cool 
Britannia.  It was out there and some of our own younger officials were quite excited 
by it in Downing Street: the prospect of Oasis and these sorts of people coming into 
Downing Street.  There was that thing about ‘Let us not just make this a meeting of 
heads of state; let us make it a cultural event as well and to be as sensible culturally 
as possible, and not to have the Spice Girls or anything’, although I believe we had 
them at the G8, rather regretfully.  We had Evelyn Glennie, the Scottish 
percussionist, and John Thaw doing a reading.  There was also poetry and ballet.  A 
couple of countries put on some splendid song and dance as well, so there was that 
sense of trying to make it into something like a fringe, with fringe events to the main 
event.   
It was also the first time that the Queen was presiding over the Commonwealth.  
Before, she had attended Commonwealths, but it was at receptions the night before. 
She opened it, however, and presided over it.  We wanted that in the news.  We 
were hell-bent on getting good coverage in those days.  I remember her looking very 
bemused during the national anthem because, as John said, it was a new version of 
it, which nobody recognised.  Nobody stood up – that was what was embarrassing.  
Liz Symons got everybody to stand up in the royal box.  She got the 
Foreign Secretary to stand up. 
It was exciting in that sense.  There was a new, ‘Let us make it youthful and 
vigorous’, not just about people getting in a room and just, ‘Chat, chat, chat’.  We 
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arranged a photo-call with Nelson Mandela walking around the golf course – things 
like that that we knew the media would be interested in – as well as going to St 
Andrews on the Orient Express.  We organised great pictures of all of that, so we did 
get into the newspapers but not much because, as has been referred to, our single 
horror that weekend was the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  The Prime 
Minister and the Chancellor, Gordon Brown, were absolutely at loggerheads the 
entire weekend on the phone.  Tony Blair was trying to do bilaterals and trying to 
have good meetings.  I remember Mugabe giving us a great lecture on land 
ownership and distribution. 
Tony did really definitely try to have these bilateral meetings but he was slightly 
obsessed with what was going on down in Whitehall, and various briefings and the 
Chancellor’s people briefing against us.  Trying to keep the whole CHOGM thing on 
the road was one of my responsibilities, and I think most people who attended it 
thought it had been successful. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Thank you very much indeed.  Stuart, if I may, what are your recollections? 
Stuart Mole 
Thank you.  Can I first say that, at the last witness seminar I attended, I arrived late 
and, to much derision, said that I had been delayed by cows on the line at Taunton.  
When I fought my way through the snow this morning, I thought, ‘I am not going to be 
late today’. 
It is very interesting to hear three colleagues talking about the summit, and I just 
want to chip in, from our perspective, with, first of all, how we saw John Major and 
Tony Blair.  The first thing to say about John Major is that he had some feeling for the 
Commonwealth originally because of the time that he spent in Nigeria, which ended 
prematurely with a very nasty road accident; but he also had that short stint as 
Foreign Secretary, where he had had a rather unfortunate experience, although he 
did not seem to think so particularly – at least not in his memoirs – at the Kuala 
Lumpur CHOGM over South Africa, where Mrs Thatcher was seen to disown him. 
He was also Chancellor of the Exchequer and he was among a long and honourable 
line of British chancellors who have advanced the cause of debt relief within the 
Commonwealth.  John Major was instrumental in encouraging the Commonwealth to 
get behind the Toronto terms at that stage in terms of debt relief.  Gordon Brown took 
34 
on that same tradition.  By the time John Majot came to the Commonwealth as Prime 
Minister, he was not unknown and he knew the Commonwealth in a way that 
perhaps Tony Blair did not. 
The other thing I want to say is that the 1991 Harare CHOGM was a very important 
one for the Commonwealth in terms of trying to exorcise the ghosts of Mrs Thatcher 
and of the whole anti-apartheid struggle in terms of the antagonisms with the British 
Government.  I think there was a recognition on the Commonwealth side that it 
meant a far greater focus on governance, human rights and democracy.  It was in the 
UK’s interests to see some coming together from what some have described as a 
binary Commonwealth that opened up in the 1980s between the UK and the rest, as 
it were. 
I mention Harare because, of course, although every CHOGM is different, because, 
while you have the Secretariat that tries to stick to its script in terms of how it plays its 
part at this summits, every host is different.  Therefore, there is a different chemistry 
and a different character to each of the summits and, of course, Edinburgh was no 
exception.  However, although the host plays a very important role, it is not the only 
player in this.  The job of the Secretary General is to conduct extensive consultations 
with other heads of government – I think there were 46 heads of government in 
Edinburgh, which was a record, and 52 countries represented overall.  Of course, all 
sorts of interests will come. 
I absolutely agree with Martin in terms of the Foreign Affairs Committee report of 
1996.  David Howell, a huge advocate for the Commonwealth then, as now, was the 
Chairman of that committee.  That was a very important report in changing 
perceptions of the Commonwealth’s role in that respect.  However, there were other 
perspectives on the economic side which were coming in and which were 
instrumental; for instance, quite a lot of countries had said that ‘Harare in 1991 
concentrated more on the political dimension and we believe there ought to be a 
Harare economic declaration, maybe even with the same instrumentality that 
developed with CMAG’.  There was, then, a feeling that there needed to be more on 
the economic side and, in particular, development.  Of course, it was in Edinburgh 
too where the small-states agenda got second wind.  Since a majority of 
Commonwealth countries – then and now – are small states, that too was important.  
When the economic declaration came out, it was an amalgam of all these different 
views. 
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Anji reminded us about the whole cultural side and the beginnings of what we now 
recognise as different forums and so on.  That was very important.  The unique thing, 
which, no doubt, Pru will talk about, is the UK Year of the Commonwealth and the 
build-up, and the way we worked together on that.  That was extremely important.  I 
hope we are going to talk about the monarchy and about some of the resonances 
now of what happened then, not just in terms of the Queen being present at the 
opening and making a speech, which was new ground, but also in other respects, 
where the question of the succession was an issue. 
On the national anthem, people said that they thought it had been played on the 
central-heating system – that is what it more or less sounded like, I think.  There 
were other aspects of Cool Britannia – whether it was wise to highlight Trainspotting 
as one of the UK’s major cultural outpourings, I do not know.  
Stuart Mole 
I am sure we will – and I hope we do – come on to discussing the retreat.  The idea 
of an away-day as opposed to an overnight stop and the retreat, ever since Pierre 
Trudeau initiated the idea, was seen as a very important creative component of the 
Commonwealth meeting. The away-day did present challenges and came in for 
some criticism for being truncated in that way. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Stuart, thank you very much indeed.  Mr Banerji, could I ask you to contribute your 
recollections? How much do they echo what Stuart has said, or do you want to add 
more, as you were Deputy Conference Secretary? 
Amitav Banerji 
I am not sure I can add more but I can contribute my own mite to this initial stage of 
the run-up to the CHOGM.  Thank you very much, Sue, for asking me to join.  It is 
lovely to see a number of old friends after a long time.  It is great that you have taken 
this initiative exactly one month before Britain hosts another CHOGM.  Clearly, there 
are some things, as you said, that are not uncommon. 
I should perhaps with an interesting historical comment that, although it underscores 
Britain’s status as a vigorous democracy, most prime ministers might think twice 
about offering to host CHOGM.  So far, the record is 100% where a prime minister 
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who offers to host does not stay to host.  Harold Wilson, in 1977, and James 
Callaghan did.  We have just talked about John Major and Tony Blair.  It was David 
Cameron who offered to host this one, and it will be Theresa May who host it. 
Like Stuart, I will comment on the Commonwealth side of things, if you like.  It is 
really fascinating to hear our colleagues from the then UK establishment.  I would 
agree that the advent of Tony Blair transformed things quite a bit.  For the rest of the 
Commonwealth, the numbers that Stuart is talking about in terms of the record 
attendance – and I am not sure whether it was 42 or 46 but it was the largest ever – 
had to do a lot with the fact that there was this new leadership in the UK, and a 
dynamic, young prime minister who had taken the party completely from the left to 
the centre.  There was this fascination but, likewise, because of what the 
Commonwealth had done since 1991 and the focus on fundamental political values, 
and democracy was at work elsewhere. There were 20 new leaders, as you pointed 
out, which was quite a change that showed that military regimes had given way to 
multiparty democracies, and one-party systems have done likewise. 
I also agree with Stuart and others that there was this focus right from the outset on 
economics rather than politics.  The Harare Declaration had made a major 
difference.  In New Zealand in 1995, at the previous CHOGM, that declaration had 
been given teeth in the Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme through the 
creation of CMAG, which was an absolutely unprecedented mechanism. The 
Commonwealth could claim that others could not even conceive of having a small 
group of eight foreign ministers at the time who could sanction existing member 
states.  All member states had collectively agreed to surrender their sovereignty to 
the extent that, if they crossed a certain line, they could expect to be rapped on the 
knuckles. 
However, there was also a feeling that this might have gone too far: ‘The democracy 
thing is fine.  We are committed to the rule of law and to human rights and to having 
elections.  For most of us in the Commonwealth, however, development is what 
matters.  Globalisation is having effects that we really do not like in many aspects’.  
There were different views across the spectrum on trade and investment.  The idea 
that there should be an economic version of the political declaration that Harare 
represented appealed to a lot of people, which also enhanced the interest in the 
Edinburgh CHOGM.  That idea was embraced by Tony Blair and by Britain at a time 
that was quite critical. 
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There had been, of course, at Cyprus in 1993 – after Harare – something called the 
Limassol Statement on the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, but that did not 
address the sense of discomfort that many people were feeling with the phenomenon 
of globalisation as you came into the mid-1990s. 
I will stop there.  There is a lot that I would like to say about the summit itself and 
what was discussed, and what the significance might have been for others.  Maybe 
one more point – and Stuart, correct me if I am wrong – is that Chief Anyaoku would 
have been one of the people who would have felt very enthusiastic about CHOGM 
coming to Britain, if nothing else because of the South Africa issue alone.  This was 
Mandela’s last CHOGM.  He had gone to New Zealand.  He was not going to stay 
President beyond Edinburgh for a very long time.  To bring him back as President of 
a democratic South Africa to a country whose erstwhile government had perhaps 
delayed the end of apartheid but where the torch of the anti-apartheid had, 
nonetheless, shone brightly – and, as was pointed out, Labour was very much in the 
lead on that – this was something that the Secretary General at the time would have 
very strongly encouraged. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Thank you very much indeed.  Ms Scarlett, could you please add your reflections on 
the Year of the Commonwealth and the character of the CHOGM at Edinburgh from 
your perspective as a leading CSO figure? 
Prunella Scarlett 
Thank you very much.  I am very aware that I am the only spokesperson for the non-
governmental sector, and that is not an unusual state of affairs because we are quite 
often ignored or forgotten, sometimes conveniently.  We do represent the people of 
the Commonwealth, which is extremely important, and I just want to put what 
happened in Edinburgh into a brief historical context, so I am not sure how well-
known this is. 
The Commonwealth Secretariat was set up in 1965.  At the same time, the 
Commonwealth Foundation was also set up, again with monies from the 
governments of the Commonwealth, and again with offices in Marlborough House, to 
promote professional exchanges within the Commonwealth.  The RCS did the 
preliminary work on that and then continued to push this as a subject that we felt was 
very important.  As you know, the Foundation moved forward and changed in many 
different manifestations. 
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The RCS had a constancy of purpose because we had our own international network 
and we were very aware of the importance and strength of the Commonwealth non-
governmental sector, so we kept at it.  We kept being a nuisance to CHOGMs to try 
to get the non-governmental sector more recognised, and finally a select few were 
allowed to be accredited to CHOGMs, although that was only a very limited list which 
was not really acceptable in the wider circles. 
We produced a paper called Towards a People’s Commonwealth, which, if my 
memory serves me correctly, went to the Vancouver summit to keep the subject 
alive.  As I said, we kept at it and we constantly tried to increase our relationship with 
the CHOGMs because we knew the importance of it, but we were very much aware 
that we were considered by some countries to be destabilising and uncontrollable 
influences that they would prefer to forget and ignore. 
However, when the decision was made to have the CHOGM in Britain, we saw the 
potential.  When I say ‘we’, it is important to make the point that it was we, the RCS, 
in collaboration with a whole lot of other organisations who felt equally strongly.  It 
was a question of how we could make the most of this particular happening, and we 
did it in two different ways. 
We invented the Year of the Commonwealth because it was a year of anniversaries 
of different Commonwealth countries’ independence anyway.  The Secretariat helped 
us with a symbol.  We were doing this, needless to remark, on a budget of zero, but 
we produced a leaflet, we had meetings and, to our delight, it spread throughout the 
country.  There was an article in Round Table that gives a list of some of the events 
that took place.  People were amazingly inventive with what they did, whether it was 
cultural or serious, or just putting Commonwealth flags in their shop window or 
having more serious conferences.  It was just quite amazing, the amount of things 
that went on throughout the Commonwealth that year, which I think showed the value 
of the relationship.  We also did it entirely to encourage knowledge and 
understanding, and it made people sit up and think.  We produced the information for 
them to work off and it went from there. 
The other thing that we were very much aware of, because of our relationships with 
the other NGOs, was that this was really an opportunity to have an NGO centre 
where we could demonstrate and share our experience as well as making it available 
to the wider public.  This is where we turned to the FCO because we needed some 
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money for this.  Sir David Thorne was then Director General of the RCS and a former 
major-general.  It was quoted back to me from the FCO that ‘David parked his tanks 
on the lawn of the FCO’ until we got the grant, but thank you very much indeed.  We 
did get the grant and we took it from there. 
We hired the Assembly Rooms, which, for those of you who know Edinburgh, is one 
of the places that plays a key role in the Edinburgh Festival and lots of other things.  
We turned to the whole of the NGO sector and they were absolutely thrilled.  They 
put on exhibitions, they demonstrated their work, they had conferences – because, of 
course, we were hoping that people would find time out of the CHOGM itself to come 
and join – and it turned into a really vital, exciting place.  I do not know if any of you 
managed to get there but it really was most exciting and it showed the diversity of 
what goes on in the Commonwealth and what the people of the Commonwealth can 
do.  It perhaps made an impact even on the CHOGM people who came and realised 
that you do need popular support for an organisation.  You need people 
understanding of an organisation that your country belongs to.  This is a role that we 
were able to play in a variety of ways. 
I am extremely biased but it was extremely exciting to be part of it and to see the 
inventiveness of the NGOs themselves, as well as the reaction of the public who 
came to take part.  Knowing how inventive NGOs are, you give them an idea and off 
they go with it.  I would just like to finish with one slightly hilarious thing.  I understand 
there were considerable problems about what the logo would be for the conference.  
It was not to be thistles – that was the message that we got.  At that time, the RCS 
had a logo of coloured ribbons as a demonstration of the diversity of the 
Commonwealth.  To our delight, that was the symbol.  (We were asked if we would 
mind.) And from then, those ribbons and those colours were used in many different 
forms and shapes throughout the Commonwealth. 
Finishing on just one vignette for you: the Year of the Commonwealth really did take 
off.  If you came out of Waverley Station in the centre of Edinburgh, you would have 
seen the most wonderful depiction of the Forth Bridge, but done in the colours of the 
ribbons of the Commonwealth.  It was very exciting. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Thank you very much indeed for emphasising the multidimensional character of the 
Commonwealth.  If I may, Sir John and Mr Hatfull, to go back: while acknowledging 
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the importance of visibility, the pressure on busy prime ministers, the importance of 
prior planning and the multidimensional aspects of the Edinburgh summit, speakers 
have referred to the trade side, which was controversial.  A Commonwealth summit 
is not simply about economics; it was also about politics.  In the run-up to the 
meeting, how far do you recollect that there were key aspects that you wished to 
address and that you wished to use the Commonwealth forum to address – 
specifically, issues around Nigeria and Sierra Leone.  Of course, the elected head of 
Sierra Leone at that point was, indeed, at the summit at that time.  There were, of 
course, other aspects which were roiling on, such as Britain’s relations with 
Caribbean countries over banana quotas. Were you seeking, in your planning, to try 
to use the summit as a way to address other bilateral or multilateral aspects? 
Sir John Holmes 
This is where I struggle a bit with trying to remember the detail of all that.  My 
recollection is that the new government wanted to demonstrate that they were very 
much a force for positive globalisation and for freer trade and investment, and this 
was one of the ways of showing it.  If you look at it in a slightly context, in the run-up 
to the G8 summit that was going to take place in Birmingham in May 1998, that was 
why there was a wish to get those positive messages in.  Of course, as various 
others pointed out, they are not straightforward messages and are not 
straightforwardly acknowledged as unadulterated goods by many other members of 
the Commonwealth who feel that these things are being done to them rather than 
done by them; hence there was quite a difficult negotiation, which I do not think the 
Prime Minister was engaged in at all personally, except when it came to the very end 
of it, when he had to balance up the last bits of drafting.  That was a focus. 
 
Another focus was debt relief, which Stuart mentioned.  The thing I particularly 
remember about this was the emphasis we gave to heavily indebted poor countries 
(HIPC), and endorsing and giving that mechanism a boost through this kind of 
communiqué was something very much in Gordon Brown’s mind as well as Tony 
Blair’s mind.  Nigeria and Sierra Leone were there as issues, and the Prime Minister 
was very glad to have Kabbah there (he was out of power at the time), and to use 
that to send a message; but I do not think he was particularly focused on it.  In my 
recollection, it was more the economic side that he wanted to push, together with, as 
Anji spoke about, the demonstration of a new approach altogether. 
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Martin Hatfull 
My recollection is very much the same as John’s in that regard, and I was not 
personally involved in negotiating the texts on these issues.  It was much more a 
sense that we wanted to use CHOGM as an opportunity to try to advance the agenda 
on trade liberalisation in particular, recognising that there would always be a need to 
balance it.  The question was the extent to which what we would ideally have liked to 
go into the economic declaration might get watered down or balanced by other 
references on the development side, for example, which were not necessarily things 
that the Government were opposed to but were not the top priority.  It was a 
negotiation which the Government went into with its eyes open and knew that a 
compromise would be reached at the end.  The question, as so often with these sorts 
of declarations, is exactly where you come out. 
 
On the political side, again it was about wanting to send robust messages and to 
demonstrate that the Commonwealth was able to stand up for its values, and that 
this was one of the ways in which Britain wanted to project its values of democracy 
and human rights, recognising, again, that that would also be a negotiation and that a 
compromise would be reached. 
 
My sense is that I do not think that there was anything that we failed to get in to the 
declaration or the communiqué in absolute terms.  Inevitably, however, the wording 
on some things was perhaps less clear or less forceful than we might ideally have 
liked.  It was an expected negotiation and process of trade-off rather than anything 
which was out of the blue. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Sir Humphrey Maud, who was Deputy Secretary General for Economic Affairs at the 
Secretariat, commented that, in fact, in contrast to the Harare Declaration, which had 
taken a very long time and had gone through various considerations and had multiple 
inputs into the crafting of the announcement by 1991, the Edinburgh economic 
declaration had been crafted and put together very quickly indeed.  Do you 
remember any sense of pressure in terms of an accommodation of Indian concerns 
over issues around trade that did not correspond to Britain’s own approach?  Do you 
have any memory of those particular debates? 
42  
Martin Hatfull 
I read that in Humphrey’s article.  My recollection is that there was quite a lot of work 
going on over quite a long period on the economic declaration, but I suspect that 
Stuart and Amitav might comment a bit more on the question of how that was then 
handled with other member states.  It was a question of the point at which you start 
sharing the draft that was being worked on at the official level between the hosts, in 
our case, and the Commonwealth Secretariat, and then sharing that with the other 
Commonwealth members.  That may have been a slightly more accelerated process 
than with Harare, but I do not know. 
Stuart Mole 
I agree and there certainly was a fairly substantial drafting period.  I was interested to 
see in one of the articles that you pointed us to that the Secretariat avoided officials 
trying to cook something too soon or too definitively, so as to allow the summit and 
the heads time to put their own stamp on it.  Amitav would probably know the detail 
better than I do, but I am sure that one of the key things was to make sure that least-
developed countries and those perceived as being left behind by globalisation were 
included in the declaration. 
 
The other aspect, of course, was that, on a practical level, the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, in partnership with the Commonwealth Development Corporation, 
launched the third of its private-equity funds for Southeast Asia, having done one for 
Africa and one for the Pacific. 
 
I do want to say something about Sierra Leone as well, if I may.  Tejan Kabbah had 
been thrown out the year before in a coup, and Johnny Koroma was the ruler, but 
there was also a largely Nigerian Economic Community of West African States 
Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) force in Freetown.  By then, the UN were 
also there.  Chief Anyaoku suggested to Tony Blair that Tejan Kabbah be invited 
because Sierra Leone was already suspended under the CMAG rules but this was a 
new twist that the legitimate ruler should be invited to the summit.  Of course, what is 
interesting is the postscript because, within two years, the intervention by the British 
military saw the restoration of Tejan Kabbah. 
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Amitav Banerji 
I was not personally involved with the drafting of the Edinburgh economic 
declaration, and I will not presume to say more than I do know, because our 
colleagues in economic affairs were the ones who were dealing with it.  I am not so 
sure that it was done in a more accelerated fashion than the Harare Declaration on 
political matters, although that was a more major step forward in terms of getting all 
the countries to agree to abide by those fundamental values.  The Edinburgh 
economic declaration, to some extent, reflected differences that existed in other 
forums; for example, in the Geneva negotiations between the UK and India, for 
example, on having a new round of global-trade negotiations, or on environment and 
climate change. 
 
Derek [Ingram] has written quite aptly in his summary that the final text included 
substantial changes secured with the help of India and several developing countries, 
and the major concern was that the danger that globalisation of the world economy 
could marginalise a significant number of poorer member countries.  There was 
discussion on differences over whether to call for another global trade round, which 
the British wanted and the Indians did not, as well as the approaches to the 
December Kyoto Climate Change conference. 
 
On the political side, if I may also venture to comment on that: it was indeed quite a 
major step to invite Tejan Kabbah, not least because, ironically, within the meeting, 
he argued for a slightly more lenient hand to be shown towards Nigeria, because 
Nigeria had been quite helpful in ECOWAS in helping Tejan Kabbah.  Although it 
was a military regime in Nigeria as well, Nigeria had promised to help restore Tejan 
Kabbah to power by February 1998, so Tejan Kabbah argued for the Commonwealth 
not to be so tough with Nigeria.  Nonetheless, the Commonwealth was tough with 
Nigeria at Edinburgh and said it would apply further sanctions.  Expulsion was very 
much kept on the table, which was the Commonwealth showing its teeth.  I just 
wanted to say that on the issue of political values.  Presumably, we will talk about 
other things, such as new members etc.? 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Absolutely – that is part of my list.  Sir John and Mr Hatfull, do you recall how the 
British Government and the FCO regarded CMAG at the time?  Amitav has made 
reference to the Commonwealth ‘showing its teeth’ – was that how you regarded the 
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Commonwealth at that time, as having effective sanctions, and that CMAG had an 
important role of oversight, correcting violators of democratic values and those who 
had overthrown governments through military coups? 
Sir John Holmes 
Yes, I think we did see it like that: that it was a little surprising in the Commonwealth 
context that, as people were describing earlier, you handed over a certain amount of 
autonomy to this body to take sanctions against other Commonwealth members.  
That was not the way that, traditionally, the Commonwealth had operated.  We were, 
then, quite keen on making sure that CMAG did not just dwindle into the sand and 
become irrelevant, and that it was still an active body.  Robin Cook was quite keen 
on that, too, when he came to office at Foreign Secretary.  We saw that as a good 
question which we should support strongly. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
You made reference to CHOGMs being the most pleasant but the least substantive.  
I wonder if the innovation of CMAG was, in fact, seen as a way of showing that the 
Commonwealth had a degree of leverage. 
Sir John Holmes 
Yes.  As a promoter of democratic values, there was a bit of leverage there, which 
was something real that the Commonwealth can do in terms of exerting some 
influence on what was happening internally within countries.  The UN, for example, 
was pretty much hands-off in that sense. 
Martin Hatfull 
That is absolutely right.  It helped to answer the question, ‘It is all very well the 
Commonwealth having these values but what does it ever do about them?’  To be 
able to demonstrate that in relation to Nigeria in particular was important.  As I 
indicated earlier, one of the concerns of the Government through the preparation 
process in the run-up to CHOGM was to make sure that it did not get watered down 
and that, if anything, the communiqué would reinforce the role of CMAG.  It was 
regarded as an important tool. 
 
[Break] 
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Dr Sue Onslow 
May I invite you to contribute your reflections and recollections of the summit itself?  
It is often said that the Commonwealth is an extraordinary, informal and personal 
association and a remarkable summit because of the friendships that are formed, the 
way of engagement and the consensual approach.  The use of first names is also 
something of which I was frequently reminded  when I interviewed leaders and their 
officials about the Commonwealth summit.  Anji, what was your perspective of the 
summit as an event?  Do you recall how Tony Blair felt it went? 
Anji Hunter 
I recall it as being modern, new, forward-looking and vigorous.  We went to the new 
Edinburgh International Conference Centre (EICC), and I think we were the first 
major event that had been held there.  It was very newly opened.  As I said earlier, 
the opening of it and the oom-pah-pah – you mentioned ‘no thistles’, and that 
absolutely rang a bell with me. 
Stuart Mole 
No kilts either and no bagpipes! 
Anji Hunter 
I remember the ‘no bagpipes’ thing, which I am sorry about now.  I remember it being 
very well put-together.  We had a production company called the Mark Wallace 
Production Company.  It was extremely well put-together.  The Queen was presiding 
over it.  There was a very informal dinner that night.  Would it have been in the art 
gallery or some library?  It was a magnificent setting.  Again, the Queen presided 
over it, which she had not done before. 
 
I was not in the discussions themselves, because I was advancing the next thing or 
going up to St Andrews or whatever it may be.  I remember the retreat was curtailed, 
as you said earlier.  It was normally an overnight stay and we seemed to rush up 
there and rush back. 
Sir John Holmes 
It was our fault. 
Anji Hunter 
The fault of EMU? 
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Sir John Holmes 
No, it was just the Prime Minister’s fault.  He just thought that three days were 
already enough, and he had to get back to London.  That was at his insistence that 
this was enough: ‘I cannot do any more’. 
Anji Hunter 
The political crisis going on back home. 
Sir John Holmes 
Even before that happened, the retreat had been cut short. 
Anji Hunter 
Before you go into these things, the Prime Minister asks, ‘What is the point of this 
and what are we going to get out of it?  What is the upshot of this?’  You always 
knew, before you went into anything, what you wanted to get out of it and what was 
the best possible result. 
Sir John Holmes 
‘What is the strategy?’ 
Anji Hunter 
Yes.  I am not sure that we got exactly what we had wanted to get.  We had 
modernised it and put it on the map, but I am very sorry to say, John, that I think you 
and Alastair Campbell took over.  In the Sunday papers, there was more about their 
golf match than about some of the things that I had set up, so I was rather miffed 
about that.  I remember there had been a paper written by two people on trade and 
investment, and we did not get what we wanted out of that.  Was that partly because 
of India?  India was stressing globalisation and we were trying to do more of the 
trade negotiations.  I remember that. 
 
In the Edinburgh Declaration, there was more about membership, the etiquette of 
membership and the process of membership, and establishing how the different 
countries could become more enmeshed.  We did set up the Commonwealth 
Business Forum, which was very important because, as was alluded to earlier, it was 
something we were very keen on as well.  I know John Major made it a principle that 
this was to be about economics, trade and business, and that was very helpful. 
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There is one other thing that we did.  I have read this subsequently and I hope it is 
right, but I do remember feeling at the time that the Royal Family and the Queen felt 
much more part of the Commonwealth.  I am not saying that they had not felt part of 
the Commonwealth before, but there was a sense of them really reengaging as well, 
which stands, to this day, as we saw a couple of weeks ago at that wonderful service 
at Westminster Abbey. 
 
I think 1997 was a little bit of a turning point in some ways.  It had a slightly informal, 
first-name-term thing about it, as you say, without it becoming informal and ludicrous.  
It still had that importance around it: ‘This is a very important set of people and they 
are doing something really important here’.  I am not sure, however, that we got 
everything out of it that we had wanted to get out of it. 
 
Aside from the comment about John and Alastair, the main story in the Sunday 
newspapers about it all was that Nelson Mandela had said that the Lockerbie people 
were not to be tried in Scotland but to be tried in Libya.  I remember that that was the 
main story, rather than any of the other things that we had wanted to put up in lights. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Sir John, in the FCO’s planning, were personalities there as well because of this 
unique dynamic to a CHOGM?  In crafting your strategy and thinking about the policy 
outcomes, were you also thinking about personalities?  Anji made reference to 20 
new heads of state at this CHOGM, but were there other aspects to personality that 
you felt were feeding into this summit that you needed to address? 
Sir John Holmes 
Mandela was the big star, for obvious reasons.  As I mentioned at the beginning, a 
feature of any summit is the bilaterals that are going on in the margins between 
everybody.  It is a great opportunity for everybody to meet each other.  I cannot 
remember who Tony Blair met.  He did meet Mugabe, and it was not a happy 
meeting, I seem to remember.  He did not, however, have a lot of time to do it 
because he was chairing and worrying about EMU, so there probably were not as 
many as there might have been otherwise.  A central part of a meeting like that is 
who else you meet while you are there, and there were quite a number of people 
who we would not have met at all before that.  How could he?  He had only been in 
office for five months, and part of that was a holiday period anyway.  The Indian 
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Prime Minister was there, and I guess he must have had a bilateral with him, but I 
honestly do not remember whether or not he did. 
 
The other thing that I recall is that his style of chairing was quite a shock to a lot of 
the people, because it was much more informal.  ‘Casual’ is not quite the right word 
but it was not the sort of thing with gavels and so on.  There was a reference in one 
of your papers to people calling it a bit ‘brusque’.  I do not know whether that it is true 
but it was certainly business-like.  I think he wanted to make sure that it was a 
success.  He was more interested in the document coming out rather than 
necessarily exactly what was in it, so that everybody could sign up to it.  I do not 
think he was arguing particularly hard at the time for a British point of view in those 
bits of last-minute drafting.  The retreat was very short but that was, as I recall, at his 
insistence and maybe others around him saying, ‘That is enough time – you cannot 
spend any more time on this.  There are too many other things happening’.  I was not 
in some of the sessions either because I was busy worrying about the single 
currency.   
Stuart Mole 
I want to talk about Tony Blair’s chairmanship.  As Anji says, he was a great star 
because of his recent victory and the manner of the victory.  It was not so much the 
fact that he was being too informal, because the Commonwealth can handle 
informality; I suspect he wanted to shut people up who he felt were being 
longwinded, and wanted to move the debate on.  That is probably something that you 
do not really do in the Commonwealth.  You must allow the consensus to evolve, no 
matter how long it takes, because it will be the stronger for it at the end.   
 
I hope you will not mind me telling a bit of a story about the retreat, which was 
illustrative of Tony Blair’s approach.  I went down early with others from the political 
side to St Andrews, where we were preparing the room for the discussion.  One of 
the interesting things about retreat discussions is that they have evolved from the 
very earlier stage, where only heads of government and the Secretary General were 
present, to gradually becoming ever so slightly more formalised, with an official 
creeping in here and there and sitting in the corner, to a slightly more formalised 
arrangement, with more officials and a table as opposed to no table, etc. 
 
I suppose Edinburgh was part of that process but, when we got there, we found that, 
on the instruction of Tony Blair’s office, apparently, it was set out in theatre style, with 
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a top table, with a seat for the Secretary General and a seat for Tony Blair, and for 
the heads to be lined up in rows.  We had to say, ‘This will not run – we have to 
change it’, so there was quite a lot of argy-bargy about that.  When Chief Anyaoku 
came, he went to Tony Blair and said, ‘We need to do it in the round’ and he 
immediately accepted that, so it was in the round.  I think there was an impatience for 
a rather more directed approach in that respect. 
Anji Hunter 
He would have wanted to control it, I suspect. 
Stuart Mole 
Yes, of course. 
Sir John Holmes 
And to keep it short. 
Stuart Mole 
Even though the discussions are in the round, they are not uncontrolled.  The 
Chairman plays a role but heads have a very fine sense of equality and not of there 
being any kind of ‘first tier and second tier’ about it. 
 
The other thing I want to say is about the Queen.  Chief Anyaoku is a firm monarchist 
and a great admirer of the Queen and the Royal Family.  He had, for some while, 
harboured the ambition for the Queen to be brought in to the opening ceremony.  
Previously, everyone thought that she was at the Commonwealth summit but, in fact, 
when there was a yacht to sit in, she sat in the yacht, or somewhere else.  She had 
her gruelling schedule of audiences, of course, and it is amazing to look at the list 
and see how many heads she managed to meet in that timeframe.  She would pay a 
brief visit to the conference centre beforehand and so on; otherwise, there would be 
no formal engagement. 
 
I think it was a great innovation that not only would she attend the opening ceremony 
but she would speak as well.  I wonder whether an element of this was the fact that 
Diana had been killed in August of that year.  Of course, that had precipitated a crisis 
in relation to the monarchy and the Queen.  Tony Blair had talked about ‘the People’s 
Princess’ and so on.  I wonder whether, in part, the suggestion that the Queen 
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should play a greater role in CHOGM was, in a way, a kind of reconsolidation of 
position after that tremor in relation to the monarchy, but that is just a thought. 
The other thing I wanted to add in terms of personality is that one of the interesting 
features was the return of Fiji and of President Rabuka, and the whale tooth that he 
presented to the Queen as an act of contrition for having left. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Mr Hatfull, from your perspective as an official, did the retreat cause you any 
concern?  After all, even though, as Stuart has outlined, the retreat had expanded, 
with accompanying officials, was there the possibility that decisions would be moved 
forward without the input of officials at such a location? 
Martin Hatfull 
That particular issue did not cause me any particular concern.  It was understood that 
the purpose of the retreat seemed to be the opportunity for a more informal 
exchange directly among the heads of government than is possible in the formality of 
the conference chamber.  What I was more concerned about in my role was that it 
was all going to go horribly wrong, because the business of training people up from 
Edinburgh to St Andrews, getting them from there to the hotel, getting the vast 
number of cars you need to get from the station at St Andrews to the hotel and 
getting them out again all takes an incredible amount of time.  We were very 
conscious about trying to maximise the amount of time they had in the retreat. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Were people using the train as part of the retreat? 
Martin Hatfull 
Yes, absolutely – that was the theory.  I was not on the train with the heads of 
government, so I do not know the extent to which that worked.  There was an 
opportunity for small group conversations.  I do think that, overall, looking back at the 
conference, it was the bit that worked least well – and did not work well at all, in fact.  
That was really down to the decision to keep it so short.  If you are going to have a 
retreat, you do need to have the time to give people the mental space to make use of 
it.  It was neither one thing nor the other, really.  I am glad that John got a round a 
golf, but even the heads of government – 
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Sir John Holmes 
I think it was six holes. 
Martin Hatfull 
You are going somewhere that is the iconic home of golf, and there was quite a lot of 
grumbling among some heads of government that they were not even able to take 
advantage of that, so it was not particularly well done from that point of view.  As it 
happens, the logistics worked as well as they could have done, but the retreat did not 
contribute much to the overall success of the event. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Sir John, is that your recollection too?  I know you won your game of golf. 
Sir John Holmes 
I was not in the retreat because we were playing golf at the time. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Surely, it is also about senior officials at such events who also network and make 
contacts. 
Sir John Holmes 
Yes.  I do not know how we managed to escape.  I cannot really remember.  I am 
sure it was Alastair Campbell’s idea.  The retreat seemed at the time a bit of an 
afterthought.  That is probably how Tony Blair was thinking about it and that is how it 
came out.  For that reason, it was not as successful as it might have been. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
One of the issues that may or may not have been discussed was the question of new 
members of the Commonwealth.  You had described in another place, Stuart, the 
interest in joining the Commonwealth that had been registered by Yemen and by the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO).  Of course, Rwanda, at that point, was also 
indicating an interest.  As you recall, how problematic an issue was this at 
Edinburgh? 
Stuart Mole 
We talked about John Major earlier.  In 1991 at Harare, I remember him specifically 
linking membership criteria with, as it were, adherence to the Harare Declaration.  He 
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did this in the meeting of 10 heads before the main meeting.  I thought that was a 
very interesting innovation: that, as you go on to set the bar for existing members 
and you develop machinery to do that, you also set the bar for new members too.  
You say, ‘Not only show that this has popular support in your country but that you 
sign up to Commonwealth values’.  I think the British view – and I am sure you will 
correct me if I am wrong – was that they did not want the Commonwealth to expand 
to countries that had no, as it were, tradition of contact with the Commonwealth.  
Therefore, John Major was not in favour of Mozambique joining in 1995, or of 
Cameroon as well. 
Amitav Banerji 
Less so, but Cameroon as well. 
Stuart Mole 
There was this broadening going on, and John Major thought that he could get round 
this issue by introducing the idea of there being a review of membership criteria, 
under the chairmanship of John Collinge, the New Zealand High Commissioner.  
That was agreed but, almost at the moment it was agreed that this procedure would 
be adopted, in true Commonwealth style the meeting said, ‘Yes, but we want to have 
Mozambique as a member anyway’. And in came Mozambique, much to John 
Major’s frustration. 
 
The idea of Palestine, Yemen and Rwanda coming would have caused anxiety too.  
In the briefing that followed, it said that this was rejected, but that is not a fair 
characterisation.  It was, as it were, laid on the table and, of course, Rwanda has 
subsequently joined.  Surprisingly, although Palestine was not a state and, therefore, 
in that respect, was not eligible, there was a strong minority opinion among heads of 
government that wanted to see Palestine in anyway.  It was a very interesting 
development in that respect. 
 
On membership, I should add that, from the Commonwealth’s point of view, there 
was a subtext about Ireland.  Certainly, successive Secretary Generals attempted to 
develop the thought that there might be an opportune moment for Ireland to come in.  
The opportunity was felt to be at the next CHOGM, in Durban, with the hope that 
South Africa and, even before he had demitted office, Mandela might lead the charge 
in helping Ireland come back.  Of course, the idea was that it would link with the 
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Good Friday Agreement and the developments that occurred there, but that was not 
to be. 
Amitav Banerji 
The membership question is quite fascinating to recall.  It is useful to recall that it 
was Mandela, in 1995, who was quite instrumental in getting Mozambique into the 
Commonwealth.  He stood up and said, ‘This is a frontline state that has borne the 
brunt of apartheid South Africa’s attacks.  They have been a Commonwealth cousin 
since 1975, when the Commonwealth set up a special fund for them.  Whatever you 
do, please take them in’.  When Mandela spoke, who would demur, and Mozambique 
came in.  It set off some alarm bells, however, and the UK was not the only one that 
said, ‘Hang on – here is a Lusophone country with no historical or administrative 
association with the Commonwealth.  You have just allowed them to come in.  You 
need to set up some rules and regulations about membership’.  That is what 
spawned the intergovernmental committee on Commonwealth membership that 
Stuart referred to, chaired by New Zealand.  I will come back to that in a moment. 
 
I completely agree with what Stuart said: Palestine had a lot of support.  The Oslo 
Process was very advanced and people thought that Palestine was about to get 
sovereign statehood.  Then, of course, some people said, ‘What about Israel?’ and 
that immediately generated a major debate.  The strong support for Palestine among 
some non-aligned and Islamic member states was immediately countered by people 
who said, ‘Israel has as much of a historical right to come in and Israel is a 
democracy’ etc.  That quite quickly put paid to the chances of Palestine coming in, 
because you immediately saw the prospect of future Commonwealth summits 
bedevilled by confrontation and contention between Palestine and Israel.  Very 
politely, the matter was simply kept under review until Palestine assumed statehood, 
which, of course, has still not happened.  Yemen and Rwanda suffered a similar fate: 
they were politely put on the shelf.  As Stuart said, Rwanda came back many years 
later. 
 
What I want to mention about membership is something that is not often noticed.  
This committee led by the New Zealand High Commissioner reported to the 
Edinburgh CHOGM, and its recommendations were approved.  One of the 
recommendations was that, effectively – and I am paraphrasing – the British 
monarch would, in the future, be symbolically the head of the Commonwealth.  This 
was a major change from the London Declaration of 1949, which talked about the 
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King at that time, not the British monarch.  I think people who let this committee’s 
report go through on the nod probably did not wake up to this, and woke up to it after 
the meeting and said, ‘Hang on – this is not something we subscribe to voluntarily’.  
Many years later, at the Kampala CHOGM, where the latest iteration of eligibility for 
Commonwealth membership was articulated, it was changed back to acceptance of 
Queen Elizabeth II as head of the Commonwealth.  This was in 2007.  I mention this 
only because the 2018 CHOGM is likely to see this discussion again. 
 
One more comment about Tony Blair and his style of chairmanship: people were not 
used to it.  An additional angle in the Commonwealth, especially in cultures like 
Africa and Asia, is that age matters and you respect seniority.  The likes of Mugabe, 
Museveni, Nujoma, Gujral, and perhaps even Chrétien and Tuilaepa of Samoa, saw 
this very young Prime Minister, unconventional in his ways, stopping debates etc.  I 
do not think that went down very well. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Do you know who drafted the phraseology of recognising ‘the British monarch as 
symbolic of the free association’ in the intergovernmental committee? 
Amitav Banerji 
It was a committee of member governments.  We in the Secretariat were not 
associated with that.  I cannot honestly answer that question, but perhaps Stuart has 
some more intelligence than I do. 
Stuart Mole 
I could not say.  All I would say is that the situation was made slightly more dramatic 
because of the way that Chief Anyaoku dealt with the question when it was put to 
him at the final press conference when Tony Blair was there with him.  The Chief had 
long had a view that it ought to be the British monarch and that there should be no 
question but that Charles would succeed, so that was his private view.  When he was 
pressed on this, he was ambiguous, I think, in his response and, therefore, slightly 
fueled the issue. 
Sir John Holmes 
Can I make a comment on the membership point?  I am not sure that the British view 
was quite as monolithic as has been portrayed, because there was an interest.  It 
was quite interesting to be part of an organisation which was attracting new members 
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and seemed to have that attraction.  There was a view that ‘This is the 
Commonwealth, not the British Commonwealth, so you do not need to emphasise 
the Empire connection anymore.  If a country wants to come in, why not?’  If you 
could see it in a geostrategic way – and Rwanda was an example – there was an 
interest.  Kagame was very much the star at the time – and still is in some eyes, but 
not in everybody’s.  If you look at it from a rather sad Anglo-French angle, you are 
weaning a country away from French influence into the Anglophone sphere.  There 
was a certain attraction to that.  Yemen had a historical link, and so did Palestine.  It 
was slightly controversial in both cases but they were there. 
 
There was an interesting in possible expansion as well as the reservations around, ‘If 
we do that, where does it stop?’  That was also a consideration.  The fact is that 
Mozambique was already in: the principle had already been abandoned so why not 
go further?  That was a view that was around. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Mr Hatfull, does that correspond with how you remember any debate or concerns? 
Martin Hatfull 
Yes, it does.  It was a debate and I do not think that there was a terribly clear position 
in regard to membership.  I suspect that that was one reason why it was preferable, 
from the British Government’s point of view, not to have a decision or a big debate 
about it at this CHOGM, because there were other things that we wanted to focus on 
and it made sense to kick it down the road in terms of having that review process and 
so on.  There was more concern to get the membership criteria agreed and adopted. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Do you recall concerns that the Commonwealth might be getting too big?  It has 
been said that, historically, the Commonwealth was more effective and more 
collegiate at this informal get-together of heads precisely because it was small.  That 
if it was continuing to expand, it lost the degree of intimacy and the possibility of 
achieving substantive outcomes. 
Sir John Holmes 
When you are 50, 55 does not make much difference, to be honest. 
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Martin Hatfull 
That is right.  It had been too big to be intimate for quite a while.  I do not think the 
British Government had – and probably still does not have – a clear idea of what it 
thinks the Commonwealth is for and what it thinks the Commonwealth is best at 
achieving.  In a sense, you need to sort that out before you decide on your strategy 
for expanding it.  I do not think, though, that that would have been an issue. 
Stuart Mole 
That is right but, at the same time, an extra leaf or two was put into the table at 
Marlborough House for regular Commonwealth meetings.  By the time we got to 54 
or 55, either end of the table was in the respective fireplaces, so there will be an 
issue down the road if we get much bigger. 
Amitav Banerji 
Just to pick up on John’s point: many years later down the track, the UK was one of 
the strongest supporters of Rwanda being brought in and was quite instrumental in 
that. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Ms Hunter, could I ask you about the Commonwealth summit and the press?  I know 
that there was a certain tension that Alastair Campbell gave a briefing before the 
Commonwealth Secretariat Information Department had briefed, which was normally 
the protocol and the practice.  You had outlined very much the determination of 
visibility and to have a strong narrative of achievement, dynamism and impulsion 
forward.  Were you using key members of the press corps?  Were you trying to target 
it particularly beyond the broadsheets, or was it ‘Any visibility is good visibility’? 
Anji Hunter 
It was not ‘Any visibility is good visibility’.  It was targeted.  I cannot remember which 
journals or magazines were picked out to take with us but there was a very careful 
press strategy worked out beforehand.  They were briefed separately but with the 
same briefing, so it was not like you gave somebody some extra bit of information.  I 
have to say – and I know have repeated this and everybody will be bored of it by now 
– that we had had our worst week of press ever in the week preceding the CHOGM.  
It was the honeymoon period and he could do no wrong, and then August and the 
beginning of September was taken up with the death of Princess Diana and all the 
fallout from that.  Then you get into the conference season and they all make their 
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great speeches.  Then we hit this crisis point in terms of whether or not we should 
join the euro.  We know now that Gordon Brown was less keen on it than Tony Blair.  
As we were saying in our break, that was probably right now in retrospect, when you 
look back, but you never know: if we had joined, would we have got Brexit?  You just 
do not know the answers to these things. 
 
However, out of nowhere, the Chancellor suddenly produced five tests as to whether 
we should join EMU.  Daily, instead of having our plan of talking about CHOGM, 
even when Robin Cook went on the Today programme to talk about CHOGM and the 
new way that we were going to do it, he was skewered on EMU and was furious 
because he felt that he had not been given a proper briefing.  All the Cabinet 
ministers were speaking on different prospectuses all together.  We went up to 
Edinburgh in a state of absolute turmoil and the press were baying for our blood.  
You could not get the press interested in the minutiae of what was happening at 
CHOGM.  They covered the opening ceremony and the Queen, because it was her 
first time, but we could not get anything through with the media on CHOGM.  When 
they get their tails up on something, there is not a lot you can do to divert them. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Sir John, as the Prime Minister’s PPS at that point, how did you feel CHOGM had 
gone?  What did you feel were the positive outcomes from the summit? 
Sir John Holmes 
I think we thought it had gone perfectly well, without wanting to think it was a 
fantastic triumph, for all the reasons that Anji was hinting it, because it had 
emphasised some of this newness which was part of the general media strategy.  In 
substance, we thought it was okay and probably no more than that, but life moved on 
pretty quickly, frankly. 
Anji Hunter 
Newness and renewal.  Maybe you were just being very nice with us, but you were 
complimentary to us and said, ‘There is a sense of regeneration among the 
Commonwealth members’.  I do not know whether that was true or not. 
Stuart Mole 
There was a very positive mood and there was that sense. 
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Sir John Holmes 
By the way, one very positive element was the relationship that both John Major and 
Tony Blair had with Chief Anyaoku, who was seen as a good, positive, everything, 
business-like interlocutor, which was not always the case before.  That was a good 
thing. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Mr Hatfull, from the point of view of the FCO, do you think that there was a greater 
learning and understanding about the dynamics of the Commonwealth? Or was it, 
‘We have addressed the summit and now, just given the speed of events, British 
foreign policy has moved on’, and you moved on in a different department too? 
 
Martin Hatfull 
I did, as is usually the way.  Yes, in answer to your question, it was an opportunity for 
a lot of people in the FCO.  I said earlier in my remarks that, before the CHOGM 
preparations, most people in the FCO knew very little about the Commonwealth.  Let 
us not overestimate it, but all of the people who were involved in the FCO’s 
Economic Department and in the various political departments were much more 
aware of the potential of the Commonwealth – and, indeed, the challenges of dealing 
with the Commonwealth as well as the opportunities as a result of hosting CHOGM. 
This is because it gives you a direct handle on the Commonwealth in a way that you 
do not get if you are simply turning up and worrying about the bilaterals which the 
Prime Minister is going to have in the margins of a meeting in Harare or Durban, or 
wherever it might be. 
 
From that point of view, it was a good opportunity to understand more about the 
Commonwealth and try to take forward that process of working out how we can make 
more use of the Commonwealth, which I think the FCO has continued to try to do 
over the years. 
 
In terms of the overall outcome, I largely agree with John.  From my point of view, the 
great thing was that nothing went spectacularly wrong, which is always your worst 
fear.  By and large, things worked; by and large, people went away feeling that it had 
been a good occasion, with the participation of the Queen at the opening ceremony 
and the high-profile role of Mandela.  Whether or not you liked the positioning in 
terms of the branding of the event, it was evident that we – the UK – were making an 
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effort and were taking it seriously.  I think that that went down well.  Overall, I think 
that that was successful from my point of view. 
 
In terms of the substance of the communiqués, from an FCO point of view, we would 
probably be a bit more generous in the assessment of ourselves than you were, Anji, 
in terms of not getting everything we wanted.  We knew we would not get everything 
we wanted, but most of the things that we wanted most were in the economic 
declaration and in the communiqué in terms of the trade-and-investment stuff and in 
terms of the business council, the business forum and, on the political side, the 
endorsement of the role of CMAG etc.  We were reasonably content, I think. 
Anji Hunter 
I would say, in the same way that the FCO felt their eyes were opened by hosting 
CHOGM and the opportunities that could be taken up, so did we in Downing Street.  
We were brand-new in there and we did not know how the world was and how it 
worked.  For us, in our first six months, to get CHOGM and all these heads of state 
here in our country and interacting with Tony, it did open our eyes up too.  I know we 
were distracted that particular weekend, but it just made us realise there was a big 
stage out there and we could perform on it as well. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Ms Scarlett, from the perspective of an NGO, what do you feel were the successes 
and legacies of the Edinburgh summit? 
Prunella Scarlett 
I think we would claim really quite major changes as a result of the Edinburgh summit 
and its legacies.  If I could just pick on one or two things that happened: the Queen 
invited the NGOs to come to a party at Holyrood.  She has always been and 
continues to be very much pro the people of the Commonwealth, and that 
strengthened that.  Chief Anyaoku somehow managed to persuade a large number 
of the heads of government to come to the Commonwealth Centre, which made an 
impact in both directions.  I picked up from some of the delegations that they had no 
idea about what was going on or the strength of the people’s Commonwealth until 
they saw it.  From the point of view of the NGOs, it was just wonderful. 
 
As far as the delegations and the NGOs were concerned, because we were there in 
Edinburgh with all these events going on, it was possible to involve senior officials – 
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or even comparatively junior officials – and ministers in the events that was going on.  
That made a terrific impact.  Not all NGOs thought the Commonwealth was 
wonderful at all but, when they saw it in action and when they saw what they could 
do because of the proximity of the two conferences going on, that made a 
considerable difference. 
 
There were various other things that came out of it.  The whole relationship – the 
official Commonwealth with the unofficial Commonwealth – changed dramatically 
and, from then on, every Commonwealth conference had accredited NGOs of 
varying kinds. 
 
One of the disappointments was the Durban conference.  When I went to the NGO 
centre there, South Africa had failed to involve the people, so it was an empty and 
extremely dreary place, and the NGOs were very sad about that. 
In Edinburgh, the Commonwealth Youth Exchange Council, backed by British 
Airways, brought in two young people from every Commonwealth country to a youth 
conference.  There is always a youth conference attached to the CHOGM, dealing 
with the real live issues of young people, and that is one of the results. 
 
Then there is the People’s Forum organised by the Commonwealth Foundation, and 
the various manifestations of that.  Always with a Commonwealth summit, there are 
all these events that happen around it.  It is also accepted by most governments that 
the NGOs play a valuable role and should be encourage to be there and to make 
their own contribution.  That has really carried on in a very big way. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
The Edinburgh summit was an innovation and an inflection point. 
Prunella Scarlett 
That was the moment when it all changed. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Amitav, do you want to add any comments on your feeling of the summit itself and its 
legacies going forward? 
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Amitav Banerji 
It was certainly billed at that time as a bit of a renaissance feeling, not so much 
because of the economic emphasis – people remember the Harare Declaration 
rather more than they do the Edinburgh Declaration – but partly because the good-
governance flagship that the Commonwealth had adopted since 1991 was seen to 
be working.  There were imperfections.  Even while Sierra Leone’s legitimately 
elected President was invited, Yahya Jammeh was sitting in the room and there were 
questions about Gambia.  Some had questions about the way Jerry Rawlings had 
legitimised himself through elections in Ghana.  Further down the track, CMAG itself 
would face the questions that you were asking earlier: does it really have teeth?  
Have those teeth worked?  The whole issue of Zimbabwe, which came to the fore 
after Edinburgh, would put CMAG’s credibility into question.  CMAG could not come 
to a conclusion and referred it to a troika of heads of government.  Further down the 
track, Gambia was still there, and the Maldives more recently. 
 
Coming back to your question, Edinburgh was, overall, a good CHOGM for its time.  
It saw the largest-ever presence of Commonwealth leaders at a Commonwealth 
summit.  To that extent, it gave it a fresh wind.  The Commonwealth then went back 
to a new, democratic South Africa, then under Thabo Mbeki, probably with a chapter 
closed in terms of the more vexed relationship with Africa in the past. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
If I may, I would like to invite questions from the audience. 
 
Questions and Answers 
Richard Bourne, Institute of Commonwealth Studies 
This is more a contribution, really: I was at Edinburgh on the fringes as an agitator, in 
that I had set up, with friends, the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) – a 
campaigning organisation to hold the Commonwealth to account for human rights – 
but also as a civil-society person.  I was on the group formed by Sir David Thorne at 
the RCS and had been commissioned by the Secretariat and the RCS to write a 
pamphlet on the UK in the Commonwealth. 
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I have three fairly brief points: first, on the issue of royal participation and the fact 
that, for the first time, the Queen made a speech.  We on the fringes were pretty 
satisfied that what Stuart said was correct, but this was part of a reconstruction, 
backed by both Tony Blair and Chief Anyaoku, who was a strong monarchist, of the 
role of the British crown in the Commonwealth post the Diana tragedy.  That was a 
very general view that that was what was going on. 
 
The second point is to do with the CHRI itself and the interaction with the heads over 
Nigeria in particular and human rights more generally in the Commonwealth.  We 
had an extremely successful televised press conference with Flora MacDonald, the 
former Canadian foreign minister, whom I drove up to Edinburgh, with Soli Sorabjee, 
the former Attorney General of India, who was subsequently UN Rapporteur on 
Nigeria, and with Wole Soyinka, the well-known Nobel prize-winner. Our Nigerian 
advisory member had been imprisoned by Abacha and we made a big noise, which 
impacted.  The relationship that Pru has referred to between the NGO 
Commonwealth and the working Commonwealth of the heads was undoubtedly there 
and it was ‘mediated’, if I may use the word, by the media. 
 
My final quick point is about the Edinburgh Declaration.  I had a row with an 
Australian official after the conference, saying, ‘This thing is never going to be 
remembered in two or three years’ time, in contrast to the Harare Declaration’, where 
people like myself, in my agitational role, had helped to make this a reality with 
CMAG etc.  He said, ‘No, Richard, this is a very important thing.  It is going to change 
the Commonwealth and it is going to change the world’.  Sadly, it was not the case, 
and the Commonwealth Business Forum, which was set up at Edinburgh with British 
money, did not have the role of either an external organisation like the CHRI, or the 
set-up of CMAG to carry forward the Edinburgh Declaration.  Sadly, in Edinburgh, the 
city of Adam Smith, this never really happened. 
 
Mary Mackie, Commonwealth Secretariat 
My first CHOGM was in January 1971, in Singapore, where the British, I must say, 
were going around in a little huddle because of arms to South Africa.  Trudeau and 
Ivan Head were the people who moved around and got people together – the 
Canadians were very impressive. 
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I would like to say a couple of things.  The Secretaries General have a lot of 
discussions with heads and they do so mostly in private and do not disclose what 
they have discussed.  I am sure that our Information Division found it very frustrating, 
but I know a lot of things that went on that were never discussed because they were 
done quietly, ‘undercover’. 
 
The other thing that I think is important is that the small countries had and have a 
voice, which they do not in a lot of forums.  It is true that, the bigger it has become, 
the more formal it has become, sadly.  When I started, it was 24 or 25 countries, and 
you sat around a table where wonderful people like Nyerere would make a quick 
remark and everyone laughed.  Now, however, it is much more formal, because of 
the size. 
Amitav Banerji 
Can I just pick up on Mary’s point about small states?  It is an important point.  
Perhaps it was mentioned in passing but, for the first time in the margins of CHOGM 
in Edinburgh, there was a ministerial meeting on small states, which Robin Cook 
chaired.  This was a huge boost for these small countries, which were a majority and, 
today, still constitute a majority of the Commonwealth.  Their special concerns and 
their special vulnerabilities were addressed at the political level. 
Stuart Mole 
Furthermore, it is always useful to see what that led to.  Following from the 
Edinburgh summit, as far as small states were concerned, there was a growing 
recognition from the World Bank and other international financial institutions of the 
special vulnerabilities of small states.  Small states would say that following on from 
that was where the World Bank in particular recognised the special nature of small 
states. 
 
Can I say something about Nigeria?  It is interesting how personalities were involved 
in that one as well.  It was a great test for CMAG and, in a sense, it could well have 
been that CMAG got out of jail by the timely death of General Abacha in unexplained 
circumstances.  However, there was a heavy investment in the engagement with 
Abacha’s regime, with 16 meetings over the course of two years or so, and criticism 
early on that there had not been, unlike the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group 
in South Africa, an insistence on visiting Obasanjo in jail.  I think Ransome-Kuti was 
in jail at the same time.  After Edinburgh, Yar’Adua died in prison. 
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We expected that, at any moment, Nigeria might flounce out of the Commonwealth.  
Had Nigeria either been expelled or flounced out, it would have been, at the least, a 
deep embarrassment to Chief Anyaoku as a Nigerian national.  Perhaps it would 
have questioned his very position, because you are not supposed to hold office in the 
Secretariat if you are not a national of a Commonwealth country.  I am not saying 
that that conditioned, in any sense, his behaviour towards Nigeria in this context but 
it was an underlying issue. 
 
The other interesting one is that Mandela’s – and those who have looked at 
Mandela’s foreign policy – own pursuit of sanctions, both at the Auckland meeting in 
1995 and continuing in Edinburgh – got quite a kickback from other African countries 
that said, ‘You do not do this to your fellow African’ in that respect, and yet he 
persisted with that.  Thabo Mbeki is someone who registered some of the negativity 
that came back from that.  In the end, the Commonwealth gave a timeframe, which is 
what the Millbrook Action Programme had said it should do.  It had these sanctions in 
the locker and it never had to see whether or not it would deliver those sanctions, 
because of Abacha’s death, but it would have been a very significant test. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Just on Mandela and the issue of Nigeria: that caused tensions and frictions within 
the African National Congress (ANC) itself, because his Cabinet colleagues felt that 
there needed to be a much more collegiate and collaborative way of formulating 
South African foreign policy, and Mandela’s stance compromised South Africa-
Nigeria bilateral relations.  It was not simply a matter of tensions within the 
Commonwealth, but also within the ANC government itself. 
Dr Balasubramanyam Chandramohan, Institute of Commonwealth Studies 
I attended three CHOGMs: in Port of Spain, in Perth and in Malta.  From my 
experience, I have two questions, and I do not know if this was the case in Edinburgh 
as well.  I was trying to see the vertical links between participating forums  and the 
idea of passing on that particular discussion to the heads.  That particular route was 
very different in different CHOGMs.  It was very quiet in Port of Spain.  In Australia, 
the foreign minister had arranged a meeting between the foreign ministers and the 
civil-society organisations.  In a way, this allowed for interaction.  I was wondering 
how it was in Edinburgh? 
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Second, I was also looking at the interfora connections and whether there was any 
contribution from the Business Forum to civil society, or civil society to the People’s 
Forum etc.  What I found was that the venues were far apart and it was difficult 
to travel from one to the other.  The Youth Forum in Perth was organised in 
Freemantle, which is another town.  Although these forums meet at CHOGMs, there 
is no interaction between them.  I suggested in many forums that there should be 
some interaction.  Just because someone goes to the Business Forum, that does not 
mean that there is nothing else interesting happening in another forum. 
 
Just as an example, in Port of Spain, I was at the People’s Forum.  I was interested 
in education.  The Business Forum had a session on private-public partnerships.  I 
wanted to check how this would apply to education.  The forum was on a cruise ship, 
so we had to register separately.  The head of the Business Forum at that time 
helped me to get in.  If these happened in silos, do you think there was much 
cooperation before these three CHOGMs? 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Do you recall any interaction between the broader Commonwealth summit narrative 
at Edinburgh, or were you still focusing very much on the intergovernmental 
dynamics of a CHOGM? 
Sir John Holmes 
I was focusing very much on the intergovernmental dynamics, so I cannot answer 
your questions. 
Martin Hatfull 
There was no communication that I was aware of between the different forums – the 
Business Forum and the NGO centre.  They were innovations in the case of 
Edinburgh.  The Business Forum took place in London just before.  There was the 
report from the Business Forum to the heads, which was reflected in the Edinburgh 
Declaration, but there was certainly never any suggestion of trying to find a way of 
communicating between the two.  Clearly, as these things develop, that may make 
sense, but there was not in Edinburgh. 
Prunella Scarlett 
No, it was such an innovation that that had not been sorted out at all. 
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Stuart Mole 
Interestingly, however, it will happen in the London CHOGM.  On the Tuesday or 
whatever, there is going to be an interconnection between the four forums. 
Diana Bailey, former Programme Manager, Commonwealth Foundation  
I retired 15 years ago, so I am a bit out of touch with what has happened more 
recently, but I was appointed to the Commonwealth Foundation in the 1980s to 
initiate their NGO programme.  That was my role.  I would differ a little with Pru over 
saying that Edinburgh changed everything in terms of the relationship between civil 
society and CHOGM, because, from my perspective, it was an evolutionary process.  
Edinburgh was really important in that evolution but it was part of a process. 
 
If I could just tell you a little bit about the history, we started the NGO programme in 
the Commonwealth in 1986.  Initially, what we focused on was NGO networking 
within Commonwealth countries.  At that time, all the Foundation’s work was about 
cooperation and exchange, and most of our work involved moving people from one 
country of the Commonwealth to another.  We worked regionally and 
Commonwealth-wide in doing that.  The NGO programme was unusual in that we 
started with networking in-country.  In the first two or three years of our work, we 
organised regional seminars.  Our first Commonwealth forum was in 1991, prior to 
Harare.  We did not have the funds to organise a forum in relation to every CHOGM.  
The first three forums were held at four-yearly intervals, not at two-yearly intervals.  
We had a forum in 1991 in Harare; the second one was in 1995, in Wellington; and 
the third one was in 1999, in Durban.  Edinburgh fell between the bigger forums. 
The other thing about the early forums was that we held them six months before 
CHOGM.  There was a lot of discussion about this but the idea was that the forum – 
and we called it an NGO Forum then, whereas it is now called the Civil Society 
Forum – was held in advance, so that the report could be written up and the 
recommendations from the forum could be received by CHOGM.  In answer to your 
question about the link between the forum and CHOGM, in those first two years it 
was the Director of the Foundation who attended CHOGM and who took to CHOGM 
the recommendation of the NGO Forum.  There was a special meeting with the 
Secretary General and with whichever country was chairing CHOGM to hand over 
those recommendations. 
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In Edinburgh, it was the RCS who organised the Commonwealth People’s Centre, 
but one of the reasons why the Foundation’s programme was successful – insofar as 
it was successful – in involving NGOs in the work of the Commonwealth was that we 
were very fortunate in attracting a very able and high-level group of NGOs who acted 
as an advisory committee for us.  We brought that advisory committee to Edinburgh.  
They met prior to CHOGM.  We took them up to Loch Lomond on a retreat and had a 
meeting with them.  Alongside the Commonwealth People’s Centre, we had quite a 
high-level but small seminar.  All the members of our advisory committee were 
involved in that.  We brought in a few other NGO leaders from around the 
Commonwealth.  We also brought in some senior Government officials. 
At that time, we were working on one of the most exciting projects while I was 
working for the Foundation.  We produced an absolutely superb set of guidelines on 
NGO governance and operation.  They included guidelines on NGOs’ relations with 
Commonwealth heads of government.  Because of the nature of the Commonwealth 
Foundation, that interface between NGOs and governments has always been at the 
centre of our work.  It did not have a high profile but that was going on as part of the 
NGO activities alongside CHOGM. 
 
After the Edinburgh experience and as a result of the fact that the Commonwealth 
People’s Centre was held at Edinburgh, at the next CHOGM in Durban the 
Commonwealth People’s Centre and the Commonwealth Forum, which was a much 
bigger meeting of Commonwealth NGOs – at the forums that we held in Harare, 
Wellington and Durban, we brought in representatives of every Commonwealth 
country.  For us, it was a very important part of a process.  Of course, as the 
gentleman here said, the interaction between the civil-society element and the 
CHOGM has gradually become closer.  I was not at Abuja, but that was very 
important. 
Arif Zaman, Commonwealth Businesswomen’s Network 
My question is about the golden thread.  Now we have ‘prosperity’ as one of the 
themes, but there was a time when economics was not being discussed.  You have 
been talking about the Commonwealth Business Forum.  At that time, I was working 
for British Airways.  We all knew that Lord Marshall was a great supporter of the 
Commonwealth, and there was no surprise, therefore, that he gave that level of 
support, but I would be interested to know the extent to which there was a 
receptiveness to the private sector beginning to take shape at the Edinburgh Forum.  
I do think that there is a golden thread that one could perhaps identify in terms of the 
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Commonwealth’s engagement on economics and globalisation, which goes straight 
to Edinburgh with the establishment of the Commonwealth Business Council.  What 
was the reaction to private-sector engagement?  What was the thinking around some 
of the ideas of the private sector at that time?  To what extent was there even a 
recognition that an institutional structure was required, which, of course, is what 
happened with the Business Council that really developed that for 17 years?  Was 
that sort of vision there or was it just in one or two heads at the time? 
Martin Hatfull 
There was a recognition of the importance of the role of the private sector, and that is 
explicit in the Edinburgh Declaration.  The establishment of the Commonwealth 
Business Council was seen as an important step.  Your question implied whether it 
was in the minds of a few people or whether it was really something that was out 
there as a major motivating force, and I think it is probably more the former than the 
latter; in other words, certainly we and the Secretariat were committed to it.  
Humphrey Maud was very supportive and there were some other delegations who 
really got it. 
 
It is always difficult because the Commonwealth is still not fundamentally an 
economic organisation.  It has to mobilise itself within the framework of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) or whatever other international structures we are talking 
about, so it does remain difficult.  In the early stages, there was a lot of talk about 
rather than simply investment from the UK, Canada or Australia into developing 
Commonwealth countries, promoting more trade among African countries, for 
example, and across Southeast Asia and so on.  The messages were a bit mixed, 
frankly, but there was a serious commitment to it. 
 
Just to pick up very briefly on the points that have been made about NGOs and 
about the importance of the Commonwealth Foundation: certainly my experience, 
from the time I spent dealing with the Commonwealth, not just in relation to CHOGM, 
was that, very often, it was the non-official parts of the Commonwealth that were, in a 
sense, the most efficient, with all due respect to Stuart and Amitav, in that the role 
that organisations like the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association or the 
Commonwealth Journalists or the Commonwealth Lawyers can play in providing 
practical support for people in other Commonwealth countries certainly was then – 
and, I imagine, still remains – very significant. 
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Sir John Holmes 
I just wanted to make a point that follows on very neatly from what Martin was 
saying.  Some would say that the Edinburgh Declaration on the economic side is less 
influential and less important than the Harare Declaration on the political side, and I 
am sure that is right.  One of the reasons is that, precisely as Martin was saying, the 
Commonwealth does not have any economic levers to operate.  It cannot change 
tariffs.  It cannot really make trade easy between member countries, except exhorting 
them to do it.  It does not make much difference.  The business-sector voice is 
important but is not going to change anything about investment conditions by itself, 
so you are always going to lack that. 
 
On the political side too, in a way you lack levers, but there is one important lever 
that the Commonwealth has, which is membership of itself.  You might have thought 
that countries could say, ‘Who cares?  What does it matter whether or not we are a 
member of the Commonwealth?’  In practice, however, they have minded historically.  
It is part of their legitimacy and respectability to be a member of the Commonwealth 
or to re-become a member of the Commonwealth if they have been suspended or 
expelled.  That has created some leverage that has given some meaning to the 
Harare Declaration and the values, which is simply not really there on the economic 
side, for all the bodies that they are supposed to be promoting in. 
Richard Nzerem 
I retired from the Commonwealth Secretariat about 17 years ago.  I still work for the 
Commonwealth Secretariat.  I want to make two points: first, Britain’s record as a 
country where the press are free to say what they want to say is undisputed.  What 
do you think can be done, either by the Commonwealth Secretariat or the British 
Government, to educate the British press particularly about what the Commonwealth 
stands for?  I have been here long enough to know that, just about every time 
CHOGM comes around, some sections of the British press come alive.  The 
permanent question is: what use is the Commonwealth?  I would have thought that, 
by now, they would know what the Commonwealth is, but they do not know because 
they come out with quite a few outrageous things about what the Commonwealth 
does, which is quite untrue.  I do not know whose fault it is, but I hope that something 
can be done about that.  I do not know what you think can be done either by the 
Commonwealth Secretariat itself or by individual governments. 
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The second one concerns the Commonwealth Business Council, which has been 
mentioned a couple of times.  I have to confess that I am totally ignorant about how 
the Business Council operated, but my understanding is that it is now dead.  I do not 
know what caused it.  Would it be fair to say that whatever caused it to die was 
wrong and that it should be revived?  I know it has been mentioned that it was 
started with British Government money.  I am quite happy that Brexit has not been 
mentioned at this venue, but would it make any difference if there was a 
Commonwealth Business Council, not necessarily to promote British business 
interests but the business interests of the Commonwealth as a whole?  It is an organ 
that really should be organic; in other words, one that can grow bigger or smaller, as 
circumstances may require. 
Sir John Holmes 
If we knew how to influence the British press, we would all be much more successful 
at what we do.  They are a law unto themselves and I am not sure that there is a lot 
to be done about that. 
 
The second point is that you just need to be careful about trying to claim too much for 
the Commonwealth because you think it is a great institution.  You do it a disservice 
by that because it can never match the expectations that you then create.  To go 
back to the Brexit point, there are some people who say, ‘Brexit is the 
Commonwealth’s great opportunity.  The Commonwealth is the new grouping to 
replace the EU’.  It is not and it cannot be.  It is simply stupid to say that and it will be 
damaging to the Commonwealth if that idea is allowed to gain credibility, because it 
will not be able to live up to that expectation.  You have to be a little careful about 
what you claim for the Commonwealth and what you do not. 
Stuart Mole 
I agree with that but I do think that the economic theme, which was the first time the 
theme was used at a CHOGM, and the Business Council itself and its successor – 
the Commonwealth Enterprise and Investment Council – has changed the mindset in 
the Commonwealth about the way that business and development is viewed.  That 
does not mean to say that overseas development assistance has been downgraded 
in that respect, but it has changed the approach from a first-world/third-world attitude 
that there was for so many years to a sense of there being great mutual advantage 
and that there are very fast-growing economies in the world that have markets that 
are of great value to the UK and elsewhere. 
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At the time of this Foreign Affairs Committee report in 1996, Catherine West wrote 
about that, and that talked about the Commonwealth advantage and so on.  It did 
change the mindset but I absolutely agree that it has been overblown, in particular in 
terms of the Brexit debate, notwithstanding the very interesting research that the 
Secretariat has done on the trade links and the level of Commonwealth trade. 
The other little footnote on knowledge of the Commonwealth is that, at Edinburgh, 
there was the Tom Symons report on studying the Commonwealth.  It was on 
studying and promoting the Commonwealth.  I am afraid that that is one area where, 
if you had a look today, we seem to have very substantially fallen down on the 
ambitions of that report.  Now, the Institute of Commonwealth Studies must be about 
the only place in higher education at least that has a dedicated institute to the study 
of the Commonwealth. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
I would just like to ask for your final concluding comments.  Ms Hunter, do you recall 
whether Tony Blair changed his attitudes towards the Commonwealth in any way 
with his first encounter, or was he simply a very busy man with the pressures of so 
many other issues that he felt he had managed it well and quickly moved on? 
Anji Hunter 
I do think that he was affected by it for the better.  As I said earlier, he had not really 
known much about it before.  He got to speak to some of these people who he had 
never spoken to before.  His eyes were opened up and it did affect him.  Look at 
Sierra Leone a few years later and various other countries that he became interested 
in and involved in, and the work that he does now with governments.  He has worked 
really closely with Sierra Leone and Rwanda.  These relationships started to be 
forged at that time because he did not have relationships prior to then, so it did have 
an effect on him. 
 
On the earlier point, I just want to say that I do agree with John entirely on wishing 
that we could influence the media more than they are able to be influenced.  The way 
that certain sections of the media have treated Baroness Scotland has been 
absolutely shocking and very disappointing.  The media that have been doing that, 
however, are the fierce Brexiteers, and I think you might find that, contrary to what 
John said, while not trying to build up the Commonwealth’s role in the future 
post-Brexit, I do think that you might find more sympathy and more publicity being 
given to the Commonwealth countries. 
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I now work for a company called Edelman and, each year, we produce something 
called the Edelman Trust Barometer.  It is a very highly regarded study that has been 
going for 18 years.  It measures people’s trust in various institutions – government, 
politicians, business, banking, media etc.  The main finding this year is that, 
unfortunately, a large number of people are not watching and listening to news in the 
way that they used to, and that those who do are going off social media and want to 
return to the old familiar ways of reporting; i.e. high standards of journalism.  They 
are extremely concerned about fake news, so we may find that there will be more 
educated articles and statements made in the media – let us keep our fingers 
crossed anyway.  I am going to leave on an optimistic note. 
Sir John Holmes 
As an addendum to what Anji said, Edinburgh was probably very good for Tony 
Blair’s relationships.  If we are honest, I do not think it changes his basic attitude to 
the Commonwealth, which was one of benevolence but not particularly seeing it as 
an instrument that he could use and therefore, something that he needed to be 
particularly interested in, as an institution or an organism. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Mr Hatfull, how quickly was there a contraction of the FCO’s attention to the 
Commonwealth?  I know that there was supposed to be revitalisation and renewed 
energy, but was it ‘back to business as usual’? 
Martin Hatfull 
Inevitably, there was contraction because, simply from the point of view of resources, 
you ramp up for an event and a project like hosting a CHOGM, and then come back 
down again.  As I said before, the fact is that the experience of hosting CHOGM will 
have made a difference, although it is quite difficult to put your finger on it.  It 
renewed awareness of the Commonwealth, to put it selfishly in terms of British 
foreign policy, as a potential vehicle for advancing different objectives. 
 
A personal observation is that I knew nothing about the Commonwealth before I took 
on the role and I found it hugely enjoyable and stimulating.  The opportunity, which is 
mirrored in the experience of everybody else who works with the organisation, to 
interact with so many people from so many different places within one framework is 
pretty much unique.  Coming back to the point about informality, which is not simply 
a characteristic of the CHOGM itself, the ease of those relationships within the 
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Commonwealth framework is mirrored at other levels as well and I found it extremely 
rewarding. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
From your perspectives at the Secretariat, do you want to add concluding 
observations on the Edinburgh summit? 
Amitav Banerji 
I have probably said all I wanted to about the summit.  The only final observation I 
might make is to link it once again to what is coming here next month.  Picking up the 
point about Brexit, it is being built as a summit in the UK that will allow the UK to 
fashion new relationships within its natural constituency – the Commonwealth – to try 
to, to some extent, atone for what Brexit will make the UK lose.  It is appropriate to 
remember the fact that the 2018 Commonwealth summit was decided well before 
Brexit happened.  It is something that happened after that decision was taken.  It is 
comparing apples with oranges to think that what you lose by way of getting out of 
the EU will somehow be atoned for and made up by your links with the 
Commonwealth. 
 
That said, I think the summit next month offers a wonderful opportunity to look at 
what the world is today.  In the past, the Commonwealth has been rather good at 
responding to current situations involving the rise of populism, xenophobia, right-wing 
politics, China as a behemoth on the global stage that goes beyond just economics 
to political influence, and now perhaps the rise of another Cold War.  The 
Commonwealth perhaps should look at the challenges that it can face in this context. 
Stuart Mole 
First of all, I want to say that, in the Secretariat, we hugely appreciated Martin and his 
team in the Commonwealth Coordination Department, because we had known some 
of his predecessors, who had been less open to the Commonwealth.  I will not 
mention any names but life had been a lot more difficult with others in earlier times, 
and Martin and his team were a complete breath of fresh air.  There was huge 
creativity.  Maybe this was also a sign of the times.  In terms of the UK Year of the 
Commonwealth – and we were just reminiscing about that – there was a hybrid 
committee of NGOs, the Secretariat and the FCO working together on this 
programme, and that was really exhilarating. 
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The other thing worth mentioning is that Edinburgh was good for Edinburgh and for 
Scotland.  Bear in mind that, despite the absence of kilts and thistles, Edinburgh had 
really had its fingers burnt in 1986 with the Commonwealth Games, when there had 
been a substantial boycott of the games by nearly all the African and Asian countries.  
Robert Maxwell had been in charge of the finances, so that left Edinburgh with debts 
that it must have only just paid off.  To have the summit in Edinburgh helped it regain 
the positive side [of the Commonwealth connection].  Nowadays, the links between 
the Scottish Parliament and the Commonwealth are very good. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Scotland held the referendum on establishing a Scottish Parliament shortly before 
the CHOGM was convened.   
Prunella Scarlett 
I would just echo what you were saying.  Edinburgh was special in terms of the 
relationship between the organisations.  For us in the NGO Centre, which was bang 
in the middle of a lot of this, it was very impressive in terms of the way that 
everybody was prepared to work together and learn from each other.  It is one of my 
strongest memories of the whole occasion. 
Dr Sue Onslow 
Thank you very much indeed, honoured speakers.  My sincere thanks, too, to the 
audience.  This has been an excellent comparative exercise as we face the London 
summit next month: an opportunity to reflect on the inputs, the dynamics and your 
own personal reflections and reminiscences around the last time Britain hosted the 
summit.  I am enormously grateful and I think now we all deserve an excellent glass 
of wine. 
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Appendix 5 
 
Extract from Chief Emeka Anyaoku, The Inside Story of the Modern 
Commonwealth (2004) 
 
The dominant theme of the Edinburgh CHOGM was economic. It was the first 
Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting that Tony Blair… would be attending. 
It had become clear to me in my pre-conference consultations with him that he, as 
the prospective chairman, was keen to bring a more practical focus to the meeting’s 
deliberations. Hence the adoption of ‘Trade, Investment and Development: The Road 
to Commonwealth Prosperity’ as the special theme for the summit. As it turned out, 
the discussion of the theme was not controversial; in the end, Commonwealth 
leaders adopted the Edinburgh Commonwealth Economic Declaration titled 
‘Promoting Shared Prosperity’ on 26 October 1997. 
 
The two other aspects of the meeting that I consider worth noting were the 
discussions of the potential new members of the organization [Palestine, Israel and 
Rwanda] at the retreat at St Andrews, and the presentation of collective personal 
gifts from Heads of Government to Her Majesty the Queen and Prince Philip to mark 
their 50th wedding anniversary in 1997. 
 
[Rwanda had raised the issue February 1996, followed by formal application] 
[Demarche from Ambassador of Republic of Yemen, January 1997. This was not 
followed up by formal application] 
[Palestine General delegate to the UK, Afif Safieh, sounding in February 1997, 
followed by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat’s visit to Marlborough House, September 
1997] 
[SG Anyaoku also sounded out Israeli Ambassador on possibility of Israel applying to 
join the Commonwealth] 
 
 
Extract from Alistair Campbell, Diaries, Power and the People, Volume Two 
(2010) 
 
Sunday September 7 
 
… I was picked up by Jack McConnell [general Secretary, Scottish Labour Party] and 
we headed for the Caledonian [hotel]. TB arrived, did a quick doorstep .. then we 
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went upstairs for a drink with GB. He was in very good form, regaling us with stories 
of how [Kenneth] Kaunda and [Milton] Obote [Presidents of Zambia and Uganda 
respectively] had responded to a display of Scottish culture at a CHOGM during the 
last devolution campaign. ‘Are you sure these people are ready for self-government?’ 
 
Thursday October 16 
 
India was our main problem early on, the Queen’s visit being seen as a debacle, 
especially after it emerged the Indians had stopped her making a toast to Madras. 
RC (Robin Cook) was getting a bit depressed with it all and blamed a mix of the 
royals and [Sir David] Gore-Booth [high commissioner to India] who said on Radio 4 
that it was ‘just a snafu’. TB had a meeting … with RC on environment, Kyoto 
planning and on India a fightback strategy based on RC articles and a lobby briefing. 
We put out a line from TB that the visit was far more successful than people 
imagined, not least in the eight big contracts being signed. RC briefed the Cabinet 
and put a brave face on it all. But he had been pretty well stitched up on Kashmir. He 
said Pakistan was an overwhelming success but the Indians really went for him.2 
 
.. I was also having a few meetings re planning for CHOGM, and trying to build an 
argument around the question – what is the Commonwealth for?  
 
 
Thursday October 23 
 
Cabinet was mainly on the EMU and most of them were saying how important it was 
to keep the option open. It was striking how pro the majority were. GB was not saying 
much. … 
RC did a number on CHOGM emphasizing how we were trying to give it a bigger 
business and economic pitch… 
 
 
Friday October 24 
 
.. TB said we had to be pragmatic but positive and I fed that thought into the briefing 
note I was preparing for 4.30 to announce GB’s statement. TB and I were both 
moving to the view that he should do the statement because it was in large part his 
credibility that had been hit, and he was better at nuance and tone. Peter M and 
Jonathan were both against, feeling it should be GB, but through the day we all 
mulled it over and moved around on it. By the time we landed at Edinburgh [for 
CHOGM] he was back to thinking GB should do it. I worked on a note on it on the 
plane and felt it was getting there, not ready for ’99, so unrealistic this parliament but 
sensible to prepare for after that… 
 
TB threw a spanner in the works. He came back from the opening ceremony and 
said he thought he should do the statement. .. 
 
[Robert] Mugabe arrived with a little posse of expensively dressed officials. He said 
in the past he used to get invites to Labour conferences in Scarborough, but it was 
too far to travel, and how Labour was always on their side against colonialism and 
imperialism. The Tories always looked at them as elements to be avoided. TB said 
colonialism was something one now read about in history books …They ran around                                                         
2 Indian accusations of a new British imperialism following suggestions by Robin Cook that 
the UK could mediate in any negotiations over the disputed territory of Kashmir. 
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the main issues on land distribution, during which we got another history lecture. He 
was pretty repulsive.  
 
…  
TB was in a better mood and quite enjoyed chairing the summit. I asked how the 
Queen had been with him and he went into one of his impersonations. ‘Now, Blair, no 
more of this People’s Princess nonsense, because I am the People’s Queen.’ He 
said she was fine, and brilliant at the way she handled all those very different 
characters. She got terrific coverage on the news, although she looked a little 
bemused at the modern rendition of the national anthem. The news was fine on 
EMU. TB spoke to GB a couple of times, and drafts were now flying back and forth. .. 
 
 
 
 
Saturday October 25 
 
TB was chairing the summit, and packing in bilaterals as we went while in truth he 
had nothing but EMU in his mind. The briefing went well, and we got stacks of fairly 
straight coverage. … I went to the conference centre to do a briefing, mainly CHOGM 
related, but I used it to get it out, as we had agreed, that Peter Temple Morris was 
writing to his constituency chairman to say he could not support them on Europe. 
… 
The main story out of CHOGM was Mandela saying the Lockerbie bombers should 
not be tried in Scotland. After a visit to the NGO Centre, I went to the Queen’s 
reception. I was hanging back just keeping an eye on things when Fellowes said I 
ought to meet the Queen. He took me to where she was listening to a gaggle of 
heads [of government], and as she turned from them [Sir Robert] Fellowes said to 
her how much help I had been to them in the week after Diana’s death. She looked 
deeply unimpressed, nodded a little and then said, ‘Do you always travel with the 
Prime Minister? I said, yes, usually, and that was about it. 
… 
We organized pictures of Mandela and TB going for a walk… then John H and I went 
to play a few holes of St Andrews… I was able to cheer up TB a bit when I described 
how I almost killed someone with a slice on the seventeenth. We went for a walk 
down the beach. He said he was really frustrated at having to spend so much time on 
CHOGM stuff when he ought to be sorting this damned statement (on EMU) ... After 
twenty minutes or so, we were ambushed again by camera crews and headed back 
after doing some clips on Lockerbie, Mandela and EMU. 
 
The only briefing I did was by video link back to all the hacks in Edinburgh. They 
liked the stuff on EMU but as I left the briefing room, Magi said I had committed a 
huge faux pas in full view of top guys from the Commonwealth secretariat. 
Apparently there should never be any briefing of the discussions themselves until the 
communiqué, and also I had briefed that Yemen and Rwanda were likely to have 
their applications rejected, after which the Commonwealth spokesperson went out 
and said I had been badly briefed and got it wrong. On EMU I spoke to one or two 
after that and they liked the TB words and felt it was turning our way a little.  
 
Monday October 27 
 
.. CHOGM finished on time. TB telling us how brilliantly he had chaired it. TB was 
regaling us with a few stories ... Mandela being difficult on a couple of issues and TB 
saying to him, ‘You are so revered you can come out with any old nonsense and 
nobody is allowed to say it is nonsense.’ Mandela laughing. .. 
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Appendix 6 
 
From the Economist, 25 October 2017 
 
 
International 
The Commonwealth 
 
It’s a minefield 
 
Summits of Commonwealth leaders have a habit of straying into unmarked 
minefields. Scripted for harmony, they can sometimes end in rage and acrimony. 
This weekend’s meeting in Edinburgh is supposed to discuss trade and investment, 
but many unexploded issues lie beneath the surface. Unless Malaysia’s Mahathir 
Mohamad lets rip again on the money markets, it is a safe bet that these worthy 
subjects will not figure prominently in reports of the conference.  
 Many conference countries have dissidents in Britain who will take advantage 
of British laws in order to shout at their rulers. Tamil and Nigerian demonstrations are 
expected. Inside the conference room, the Caribbeans will complain about threats to 
their banana deal with Europe and the Pacific islanders will splutter about pollution 
from Australia. Britain is open to attack on several fronts. Some see Britain’s new 
‘ethical’ foreign policy and concern for human rights as a neo-colonial attempt to 
impose ‘western values’ on them. 
 Some former colonies still have an imperial bone or two to pick with Britain, 
and what better place to do it than at a Commonwealth summit on British soil? 
Mauritius will ask why Britain still holds onto the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, 
on loan to the United States as an airbase, now that the Cold War is over. A truculent 
Robert Mugabe has announced that he will confiscate some white-owned land in 
Zimbabwe without compensation, adding that Britain can pay ‘its children’ if it wants 
to. Then there is the aftermath of Queen Elizabeth’s bumpy passage to Pakistan and 
India and the prickly issue of Kashmir. 
 Taking evasive action, the British government hopes to distract the visiting 
heads of government with a video about Britain and a speech by the Queen. The 
visitors are also being deprived of their special overnight retreat, a valued tradition 
which allows them to solve the world’s problems together in undisturbed overnight 
chat.  
 Britain will want to spend time discussing Sierra Leone, where it believes 
democratic government will soon be restored. It financed a meeting for the exiled 
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Sierra Leonean government this week, and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the country’s 
elected president who was overthrown by a coup in May, has been invited to take 
Sierra Leone’s chair in Edinburgh. From there, Mr Kabbah is expected to fly to a 
small area of Sierra Leone not in the hands of the soldiers who overthrew him. If all 
goes well, he will seek to reclaim his job, either by negotiation or by the use of 
military force. 
 But that brings the summiteers up against the vexed question of Nigeria. 
Nigerian troops form the core of the West African peacekeeping force which holds 
Sierra Leone’s main airport. Only they are capable of restoring Mr Kabbah. Though 
Nigeria is suspended from the Commonwealth, it will try and exploit this leverage to 
the full. 
 At the last Commonwealth summit, two years ago in New Zealand, Nigeria 
was threatened with expulsion if it did not restore democracy. But its military ruler 
General Sani Abacha, has done none of the things demanded of him. Instead he has 
managed to force the Commonwealth to accept his own programme and timetable 
for a return to civilian rule. And on the eve of the Edinburgh meeting he is threatening 
to gatecrash it by flying in a delegation to put Nigeria’s case. The empty chair at the 
summit may be the most troublesome.  
 
 
From the Economist, 25 October 1997 
 
More than a cosy club 
 
The Commonwealth has principles. It should defend them  
 
For an organization that owes its membership to the accidents of history, the 
Commonwealth is a remarkably popular club. Of the 52 heads of government invited 
to the two-yearly summit to be held this weekend in Edinburgh, 45 have said they will 
be there. By contrast, the opening sessions of the UN General Assembly in New 
York last month attracted only 18 heads of state and 14 prime ministers out of a total 
of 185. The geographically, linguistically and culturally disparate members of the 
Commonwealth used to have at least one thing in common: they were once ruled by 
Britain. With the admission of Mozambique, even that rule has now been broken. 
Meanwhile, Yemen, Rwanda and the Palestinians want to join. There is even talk of 
Ireland rejoining after nearly 50 years outside. Clearly the Commonwealth is as cosy 
a club as only the British could devise. But what is it for? 
 Until recently the club offered simply, well, clubbiness. It provides an informal 
but reliable network of advice, expertise and contacts. It can help members write a 
new constitution or run an election, manage a forest or even the national debt. The 
smaller fry can rub shoulders with members of the G7 group of rich, industrialised 
countries and one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, who can 
then speak for them at the world’s top tables. 
 But the Commonwealth is now meant to be more than that. Summits used to 
be a colourful collection of democrats and dictators; the way they ran their countries 
was their own affair (even Idi Amin, Uganda’s notorious dictator, was merely asked, 
politely, to stay away from the meeting in 1977). Then six years ago, at Harare, the 
club set itself new goals: the establishment of democracy, the rule of law and respect 
for human rights among all its members. Two years ago, in Auckland, leaders were 
discussing how to give teeth to these principles when Nigeria’s military regime 
executed one of its harshest critics, along with eight others. Outraged, the 
summiteers suspended Nigeria and threatened that if, by Edinburgh, it had not 
released named political prisoners and bowed to the Harare principles, it would be 
expelled. 
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 Nigeria has thumbed its nose. Delegations of foreign ministers sent by the 
Commonwealth to press its demands have been humiliated. Nigeria’s boss, General 
Sani Abacha, has kept them waiting refused them permission to visit imprisoned 
political leaders and demanded instead that the Commonwealth apologize to Nigeria 
for suspending its membership. Yet, if the Commonwealth is to be seen to keep its 
word, it should surely carry out its expulsion threat. The case could not be clearer. 
But that will not happen. Instead, General Abacha is to be allowed to carry through 
his transition to civilian rule next year (though this had previously been denounced as 
undemocratic and not speedy enough). Minor sanctions are threatened if he does not 
keep to the schedule.   
 
Moral suasion but suasion nonetheless 
 
So was the Commonwealth wrong to take up the moral cause of human rights and 
democracy? No, though its moral authority has suffered through the Nigerian 
debacle. Here, clubbiness is a failing. Most members, especially the poor ones, feel 
that the Harare principles are to be aspired to, not rigidly adhered to. If cads could be 
booted out, they worry, how many other members might be found wanting? 
 Yet even as a more soft-centred club, the Commonwealth can still do good. 
The power of embarrassment is well worth using. And there are tougher sanctions 
than those tried so far on Nigeria, such as freezing the bank accounts of its generals, 
perhaps. If the Commonwealth’s principles are to be worth aspiring to, they need 
defending. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
